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I. INTRODUCTION

In December, 1896, Samuel Gompers addressed the AFL convention in Cincinnati,
Ohio.' During the course of his address he outlined what he believed to be the aims and
purposes of the trade union movement. To Gompers and the other early leaders of the
labor movement of that day, the unions could be nothing but democratic. The power
acquired through the mutual association of workers seeking common goals could never
be exercised but in the best interests of the individual workers.
But much has transpired since 1896. In 1900, less than a million of our 29 million
gainfully employed population were unionized. 2 By 1950 there were 15 million workers
in unions, and practically every large manufacturing industry was either completely or17 million men and women are members
ganized or almost so.3 Today, approximately
4
of our various labor organizations.
Union funds, realized through such various sources as dues, fines, and assessments,
and representing pension and welfare plans, were minimal until about 1942.5 By 1954,
under the impact of the events attendant upon World War II and the Korean conflict,
they had reached an accumulated wealth of 20 billion dollars.6 Estimates today place
their total value near 34 billion dollars, increasing by the incredible sum of four billion
dollars a year, 7 and it has been predicted that their value will increase until they reach
about 80 billion dollars, at which time an equipoise will be reached between contributions and benefit payments. 8 The social and economic significance of union wealth,
particularly welfare and pension funds, may be partially illustrated by the fact that
their coverage, in terms of workers and their dependents, approaches 75 million persons,
or nearly one-half of the population of the entire United States. 9
In Gomper's day, the attitude of the law toward the labor movement was reluctant
acceptance, if not active animosity. The use of the labor injunction was widespread.' 0
This was the era of the Debs" case, where the federal troops ended a railroad strike,
and the Danbury Hatters case, 12 where a hostile Supreme Court, in obvious contradiction of legislative intent, applied the Sherman Act' 3 to a labor union.
Today much of this has changed. The union's position in society is maintained not
only by its own internal strength and favorable public opinion, 14 but by positive federal
and state legislation. The Railway Labor Act, 15 the Taft-Hartley Act, 16 and similar
state legislation' 7 provide affirmative legal protection for organizational activity and
1

GOMPFRS, LABOR ANIDTHE COMMON WELFARE 5 (1919).

2

Clague, The American Worker and American Industry, 71 MONTHLY LABOR REVIEW 11 (1950).

3
4

Ibid.

13 LABOR FACT BOOK 83 (1957).

5 Dubinsky, Safeguarding Union Welfare Funds, American Federationists, July, 1954, p. 10
(reprinted in 100 CONG. REc. 10318 (1954).

6 U.S. News &World Report, Sept. 24, 1954, pp. 129-30.
7 Levitan, Welfare and Pension Plans Disclosure Act, 9 LAB. L. J. 827, 828 (1958). It is also
estimated that the total annual contributions to these funds approach $9 billion, and the benefits
paid under these plans are close to $5 billion a year.
8 Ibid.
9 Subcommittee on Welfare and Pension Funds of the Senate Committee on Labor and Public
Welfare. Final Report on Welfare and Pension Plan Investigation, S. REP. No. 1734, 84th Cong.,
2d Sess. 6 (1956) (hereinafter cited as 1956 Final Rep.).
10 See generally, FRA KFURTER & GREENa, THE LABOR INJUNCTION (1930).
11 In re Debs, 158 U.S. 564 (1895).
12 Loewe v. Lawlor, 208 U.S. 274 (1908).
18 26 Stat. 204 (1890), 15 U.S.C. 1 (1952).
14 Despite the favorable opinion which does exist in some quarters today, it is still true that:
The leaders of industry, until the day before yesterday at most, were convinced that trade-unionism was an evil to be resisted to the bitter end. Even after
years of federal legislation favoring trade-unions, the hope still survives that
American public opinion will one day turn against organized labor. TANNENBAUM, A PHILOSOPHY OF LABOR 63 (1952).
'5 44 Stat. 577 (1926), as amended, 45 U.S.C. § 151 (1952).
16 Labor Management Relations Act, 61 Stat. 136 (1947), 29 U.S.C. 141 (1952).
17 See, e.g., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 211 (1952).
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collective bargaining. The Norris-LaGuardia Act,' 8 under the Supreme Court's decision
in United States v. Hutcheson,19 and similar state statutes, 20 free the union from
anti-trust prosecution.
The labor movement has come a long way from its beginnings in the 1800's of
Samuel Gompers. As the legally protected, exclusive bargaining agent of workers in
an industrial area, the union weighs, determines, and implements policies which vitally
affect the everyday lives of all those whom it represents. It negotiates a contract which,
in effect, becomes the basic law of that industrial community. The union in a very real
sense is the employee's industrial government, and the power it exercises over the lives
of its members is of a quasi-governmental character.
To state the facts of union power is not necessarily to criticize. The existence of
union power is not the subject of this survey. Our concern, rather, is with the manner
in which this power is exercised. As a people we are committed to the proposition that
the exercise of power within our society must be responsive to democratic processes,
and must be employed at all times with a judicious concern for the individual liberties
of our citizens.
Our concern, then, in this survey is with the problem of the exercise of union
power in relation to the rights and dignity of the individual worker. It is, in short, a consideration of civil liberties within the labor muovement.
The survey itself is divided into four broad areas: union admission policies and
practices, union disciplinary procedures, union funds, and union elections. In each
section, consideration is first given to the basic law of the union itself, the union constitution, with the conviction that it represents, although not the complete picture, at
least the conscious embodiment of the general standards under which the average union
conducts its day-to-day affairs. 2 ' Following an analysis of the constitutions, each section
considers in turn the applicable case law and present legislation on a federal and state
level, ending with a discussion of some of the more important current legislative
proposals
With the appearance of this survey, the Notre Dame Lawyer is continuing a feature
inaugurated in May of 1958 with the publication of a Church-State Note - Religious
Institutions and Value: A Legal Survey. In alternative years *with the Church-State
Note, the Lawyer will publish a legal consideration of the more significant problems
posed by the presence of the individual in the modern industrial community - Economic
Institutions and Value: A Legal Survey. This particular Note is concerned basically with
the problem in the context of the internal affairs of the labor union. In-future years, the
Note will not necessarily be confined to this area, but will attempt to consider the broad
problem posed by individual freedoms and responsibilities within the context of the
whole economic order. Our concern will be at all times with the position occupied by
the individual person in respect to his industrial community.
II. UNION MEMBERSHIP
Today, union membership is often a prerequisite to the acquisition 22 and retention2 3 of employment. But even when not mandatory, union membership remains a
valuable asset. Effective participation in union affairs by all workers is a necessity if
human rights are to be preserved. Often the only check on the exercise of union power
Federal Anti-Injunction Act, 47 Stat. 70 (1932), 70 U.S.C. § 101 (1952).
19 312 U.S. 219 (1941). Unions are, however, subject to such prosecution where the combination
in question is with non-labor groups. Allen Bradley Co. v. Local 3, Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 325
U.S. 797 (1945).
18

20
21

See, e.g., NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2A: 15-51 (1952).

The lack of an adequate national study of union constitutions in the particular area of union
election procedures necessitated a student survey of the area, which appears at some length in the
beginning of section five. The survey introducing the other three sections of the Note are based on
a study of 194 American labor unions by the National Industrial Conference Board, published in
1955, and supplementary student research.
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is that found in the active union member. "To deny a fellow-employee membership ...
may operate to prevent that employee from having any part in the determination of
labor policies to be promoted and adopted in the industry .... -"24It amounts to industrial
disfranchisement. The very purpose of the trade union movement lies in the elimination
of the unilateral decision. "The individual workman cannot just 'go it alone.' Every
person with an understanding25 of mass production ... long ago recognized the necessity
of collective bargaining .... Such a situation inevitably poses the question: Does a worker have a legally enforceable right to join a union? It is the purpose of this initial section to explore this
question and the larger area of union membership policies and practices. Our point of
view will at all times be the relationship between the individual worker and the union.
A. Union ConstitutionalProvisions
Any discussion of the employee's right to participate in union activity necessarily
involves a consideration of the membership policies of the unions themselves. Although
a union's constitution generally indicates its
by no means presenting a complete picture,
20
attitude toward prospective members.
Membership is normally achieved in one of four ways, or through a combination
thereof. The majority of unions simply admit all applicants employed at the craft or
in the industry under the union's jurisdiction. 27 Most unions not only want new members, they need them. The very life's blood of a union is a continually expanding membership. Some unions, however, admit new members only by a system of "fraternal"
voting.28 Others provide that members are only to be admitted through an apprentice
program. 29 And, finally, a few provide for a dual system of an apprentice program and
fraternal voting. 0 These latter three groupings, placing restrictions on the methods by
which admittance may be gained, are for the most part the older craft unions which
had their beginnings in fraternal societies, and these restrictions represent ihe vestiges
of this earlier type of organization.
Although most workers are eligible for membership, the fact remains, unfortunately,
that some groups are systematically excluded. Many unions provide that communists
22 Under the Labor Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley), 61 Stat. 140 (1947), 29 U.S.C.
§ 158 (a) (3) (1952) the closed shop is illegal. Hence it would appear the union membership should
not be a prerequisite to the acquisition of membership. But in many situations such is not the case.
See, e.g., Thorman v. International Alliance of Theatrical Stage Employees, 49 Cal. 2d 625, 320
P.2d 494 (1958), where the court explicitly found that a closed shop existed. See also Chicago SunTimes, Nov. 10, 1958, p. 5, col. 1, where it is reported that the Plumbers and Pipefitters recommended
to their locals the elimination of the traditional closed shop. The article also notes that the practice,
despite the Taft-Hartley Act, has continued to exist in some of the building trades.
28 A recent study of 1716 collective bargaining agreements by the Bureau of Labor Statistics
revealed that nearly two-thirds contained union shop provisions. Theodore, Union-Security Provisions

in Agreements, 1954, 78 MoNTnI.Y LABOR REIaw 649 (1955).

24 Railway Mail Ass'n v. Corsi, 326 U.S. 88, 94 (1945).
25 Betts v. Easley, 161 Kan. 459, 169 P.2d 831, 839 (1946).
26 In Yeager v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, Local 313, 39 Wash. 2d 807, 239 P.2d 318
(1951), a disabled veteran was, under the constitution, "eligible" to join the local, but because of a
scarcity of work in the area the local refused to admit him. Hence, it is often the constitution plus
local practices and conditions which determine whether a particular worker will be permitted to
join the union.
27 125 unions with approximately 11,554,460 members, or 66% of all unionized labor, have this
type of admittance program. Handbook of Union Government Structure and Procedures, National
Industrial Conference Board, Studies in Personnel Policy, No. 150, p. 54 (1955) (hereinafter cited as
HANDBOOK).

28 27 unions having approximately 1,631,342 members, or 9.3% of all unionized labor, fall into
this category. Ibid.
29 25 unions with approximately 850,667 members, or 4.8% of all unionized labor, have this
program. Ibid.
80 17 unions having approximately 3,477,329 members, or 19.9% of all union labor, provide for
this dual system. Ibid.
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and members of subversive groups are not eligible for membership. 31 Such provisions
are clearly understandable in light of the trouble many unions experienced during the
early thirties when groups of this type attempted to subvert the trade union movement
to their own ends. On the other hand, a few unions expressly provide in their constitutions that certain racial groups are to be excluded. 32 Provisions of this type are without
justification. Some unions also bar supervisors, 33 non-citizens, 34 or discriminate on the
basis of sex. 3 5 In contrast to these restrictive provisions, however, many unions explicitly
state that all workers, regardless of sex, race, creed, color, or nationality are eligible for
36
membership.
The types of discrimination practiced by unions vary. The most obvious, of course,
is when the prospective member is simply refused membership.3 7 Some unions, on the
other hand, accept the unwanted applicant, but relegate him to an auxiliary local. 38
Discrimination may also be involved in a local's refusal to accept a transfer member
from a sister local of the same international union.39
Perhaps the most frequently utilized method of achieving discrimination of the
total exclusion type is the fraternal system of voting. The voting is usually done by
means of "blackballs," and if the applicant receives more than two, his petition is
rejected. 40 Discrimination of this type is obviously difficult to establish, since the precise
reason for rejection is not spelled out, and consequently it presents a more difficult
problem to agencies attempting to enforce anti-discrimination legislation. Normally this

31 56 unions with approximately 6,190,044 members make such restrictions. Besides Communists,
such groups as Nazis, Fascists, and the Ku Klux Klan are expressly excluded. Only six unions expressly exclude Communists. Id. at 54-55.
32 Five unions having a declared membership of 442,197 men make such restrictions. Brotherhood
of Locomotive Engineers, CoNsT., § 28(a), p. 89 (1956), "No person shall become a member of the
B of L.E., unless he is a white man . . ."; Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen and Enginemen,
CONST., art. VIII, § 29(b), p. 86 (1953), "He shall be white born . . . Mexicians, or those of
Spanish-Mexican extraction are not eligible." (The paragraph does, however, further specify that the
provision shall be inapplicable where contrary to local law.); Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen,
CONSr., § 110, p. 76 (1954), "The applicant shall be a white male..
" (This constitution also
contains a saving clause specifying its inapplicability where contrary to local law.); National Postal
Transport Ass'n, CONST. art. III, p. 6 (1958), "Any . . . clerk..., who is of the Caucasian race, or
a native American Indian, shall be eligible to membership.
(This paragraph also contains a
saving clause.); Railway Conductors, HANDBOOK p. 54.
33 35 constitutions covering 3,383,482 workers have such provisions. HANDBOOK p. 55.
34 The form this disqualification takes is usually mitigated by requiring that the member express
an intention to become a citizen. See, e.g., International Longshoremen Ass'n, CoNsT., art. XIV,
§ 2 p. 27 (1957).
35 See, e.g., Wilson v. Hacker, 200 Misc. 124, 101 N.Y.S.2d 461 (Sup. Ct. 1950) where several
barmaids were refused membership in a bartenders' union. The court held the restriction unlawful
since it was coupled with a closed shop.
36 39 union constitutions covering 4,320,551 workers have explicit anti-discrimination clauses.
Handbook, p. 64. Such a clause, however, does not necessarily mean the union does not practice some
form of discrimination. Some constitutions also provide for the establishment of dual locals "where
the question of race . . . would interfere with the growth of the International Union." Cigar Makers
Int'l Union, CoNsT., § 80, p. 44 (1957).
37 Se, e.g., International Bhd. of Elec. Workers, Local 35 v. Commission on Civil Rights, 140
Conn. 537, 102 A.2d 366 (1953), where a Negro was refused membership. The court held that under
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 7405(c) (1949), such discrimination was unlawful and ordered the Negro's
admission to the union.
38 See, e.g., Betts v. Easley, 161 Kan. 459, 169 P.2d 831 (1946) where Negroes were admitted
to union, but relegated to an auxiliary where they had no rights to participate in the union's activities.
The court held that such discrimination was unlawful under the Railway Labor Act, 44. Stat. 577
(1926), as amended, 45 U.S.C. § 151 (1952).
39 See, e.g., Byran v. International Alliance of Theatrical Stage Employees, 306 S.W.2d 64 (Tenn.
App. 1957). Here the court dismissed the complaint on the grounds the members had not exhausted
their internal remedies.
40 See, e.g., Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen and Enginemen, CoNsT., art. VIII, § 31, p. 88
(1953).
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system is used to limit membership to relatives, 41 or those of the same ethnic or racial 4 2

group as the other members of the union. "Local unions consisting exclusively of ItalianAmericans, for instance, are common in some of the building trades."'43 The apprentice
program may also serve as a vehicle of exclusion. It may, as a matter of fact, be impossible for
particular groups to obtain the requisite degree of proficiency for journey44
menship.
Considered as a whole, however, it would seem that the membership policies and
practices of most unions are consonant with generally accepted notions of fair play
and justice. It is, for example, one of the stated objectives of AFL-CIO "to encourage
all workers without regard to race, creed, color, natural origin or ancestry to share
equally in the full benefits of union organization. '43 Those unions which, unfortunately,
refuse to live up to this ideal constitute the exception, not the rule.
B.

Judicial Consideration of Discrimination in Admittance

Realizing that discrimination does occur, can a prospective member who is unjustly
excluded from a union obtain any judicial relief? Traditionally, labor unions have been
classified as voluntary associations, placing them in the same legal category as churches
and fraternal groups. 46 Following the voluntary association rationale, in 1890 a New
Jersey court in Mayer v Journeymen Stonecutters Ass'n asserted:
.
[N]o person has any abstract right to be admitted to [unioni membership ....
Until so admitted, no right exists which the courts can be called upon to
protect and enforce. The body [has a] clear right to prescribe qualifications for its
membership.... It may make the restrictions on the line of citizenship, nationality,
age, creed, or profession ....
This-power is incident to its character as a voluntary
association.47

Unfortunately this view still finds limited acceptance. The Wisconsin Supreme
Court, in the recent case of Rose v. Elbert,48 affirmed, inter alia, the right of a union
to exclude two Negro bricklayers from membership solely on the basis of their race. The
pernicious effects of such a holding are readily evident today, however appropriate such
a classification might have been when trade unions first appeared before the courts.
When the union's unique social, political and economic status in today's modem society
is considered, the continuing mechanical application of the voluntary association rules
in the labor field becomes highly questionable.

But the courts have not been totally blind to the developments which have taken
place since 1890, and a change has resulted in the judicial treatment of the excluded
applicant. This change has arisen mainly from a realization of the implications of the
41 See, e.g., Bryan v. International Alliance of Theatrical Stage Employees, 306 S.W.2d 64 (Tenn.
App. 1957) (sons given preference); Clark v. Curtis, 297 N.Y. 1014, 80 N.E.2d 536 (1948) (sons
only).
42 See, e.g., Oliphant v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen, 156 F. Supp. 89 (N.D. Ohio),
cert. denied, 335 U.S. 893 (1957), afi'd, 262 F.2d 359 (6th Cir. 1958), cert denied, 359 U.S. 935
(1959, where two Negro firemen were denied admission. The court upheld the union's exclusion
rule. See text, p. 392 infra, for a discussion of this case.
43 HANDBOOK p. 58.
44 Summers, Right to Join a Union, 47 COLUM. L. REv. 33, 35 (1947).
45 AFL-CIO, CONST., art. II (4), p. 3 (1957).
46 See generally, Chafee, The Internal Affairs of Associations Not for Profit, 43 HARv. L. REv.
993 (1930).
47 47 NJ. Eq. 519, 20 Ad. 492, 494 (Ch. 1890) (dictum). The precise holding of this case was
that the excluded applicant had not complied with the regular admission rules.
48 275 Wis. 523, 82 N.W.2d 315 (1957). Wisconsin, apparently as a result of the decision in
Ross, amended the anti-discrimination statute under which the action was brought. Wis. STAT. ANN.
§ 111.31 (1957), as amended, Wis. STAT. ANN. § 111.36 (Supp. 1958). The court held that the
statute was merely declarative of public policy, since it did not provide remedial procedures, and that
the common law rule for voluntary associations controlled. The effect of the amendment seems to be
to overrule this determination. For an excellent discussion of the entire statute, see 1958 Wis. L. Ray.
294. See also text at p. 393 infra.
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closed shop.49 The California Supreme Court in James v. Marinship Corp.,50 recognized
a limited right to union membership, holding that a union may not maintain both an
arbitrarily closed union and a closed shop. The court noted that in this situation the
union "may no longer claim the same freedoms from legal restraint enjoyed by golf
clubs or fraternal associations."'
In the James case, the court grounded its decision on the presence of a labor
monopoly held by the union. In Williams v. InternationalBhd. of Boilermakers,52 however, this same court liberalized its prior decision, holding that the presence of the
labor monopoly was not necessary for a cause of action, while it re-affirmed the essential incompatability of the arbitrarily closed union and the closed shop. In both the
James and Williams cases, the court's decree was stated in terms of alternatives. Either
abandon the closed shop or the closed union. Recently however, the court has further
extended the rationale of James. In Thorman v. International Alliance of Theatrical
Stage Employees,53 the court simply directed that the excluded applicant be admitted
to membership, showing no particular concern about union monopoly, and granted
damages for attorney fees and the loss of earnings sustained while he was unable to
obtain work without a union card.
C.

State Legislation

Recognizing, perhaps, the inadequacy of the prevailing legal attitudes, several states
have enacted legislation designed to eliminate discrimination from the industrial scene.
Fourteen states presently have enforceable anti-discrimination statutes. 54 Two states
have statutes, similar to the one under which the Ross 55 case was decided, which are
merely declarative of public policy and do not provide remedial procedures.9 6
New York's Civil Rights Law of 194057 was the first passed which specifically
dealt with the problem. The act was immediately challenged as being unconstitutional,
but the Supreme Court in Railway Mail Ass'n v. Corsi58 upheld the state's power to
legislate in this field. The law proved ineffective, however, and in 1945 the state passed
the nation's first Fair Employment Practices Act,59 which has since become the prototype
for other state legislation.
49 The court in Carroll v. Local 269, 133 NJ. Eq. 144, 31 A.2d 223 (1943) aptly expressed this
attitude when it said at page 225:
If the characterization of a labor union as a voluntary association becomes in
time a mere anachronism, the mere word "voluntary" will not likely preserve the
present state of the law.
Again, it is wise to foresee that a change in surounding circumstances - such
as the economic strength of competing groups - may make the existing law disjointed and an instrument of oppression if strictly adhered to. "
50 25 Cal. 2d 586, 155 P.2d 329 (1944). For a thorough discussion of the closed union-closed
shop dilemma prior to Taft-Hartley, see Annot., 160 A.L.R. 900 (1946).
51 Id. at 335.
52 27 Cal. 2d 586, 165 P.2d 903 (1946).
53 49 Cal. 2d 625, 320 P.2d 494 (1958).
54 ALASKA COMP. LAWS ANS. § 43-5-4(2) (Supp. 1958); Colo. Sess. Laws 1957, ch. 176, § 5
(3); Cos.
GEN STAT. § 7405(c) (1949); MAss. ANN. LAWS, ch. 151 B, § 4(2) (1957); MiAH.
STAT. ANN.

§

17.458(3)(c)

(Supp. 1957); MINN.

STAT. ANN.

§

363.03(1)

(1957);

NJ. STAT.

ANN. § 18:25-12(b) (Supp. 1958); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 59-4-4(b) (1953); N.Y. EXECUTIVE LAW
§ 290, § 296(1)(b); ORE. REv. STAT. § 659.030 (2) (1957); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 955(c)
,(Supp. 1957); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. tit. 28, ch. 5, § 7(c), ch. 6, §§ 1, 3 (1956); WASH. REv. CoDa
§ 49.60.190 (1957); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 111.31, § 111.32(1)(5) (Supp. 1958). Twenty-five municipalities also have some form of Fair Employment Ordinance. S. Doc. No. 15, 83rd Cong., 1st Sess.
1 (1953).
55 Ross v. Elbert, 275 Wis. 523, 82 N.W.2d 315 (1957). See n.48 supra, and the text at p. 393
infra, for a discussion of this case.
56 IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 40-2301 (2), 40-2303 (2d) (2) (Supp. 1957); KAN. GEN. STAT. AsN.

§§ 44-104, § 44-1002(d) (Supp. 1957).
57 N.Y. Cirv. RioiTs LAws § 43.
58

326 U.S. 88 (1945).

59

N.Y. ExcuivaE LAW

§§

290-301 (Supp.)
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Discrimination within the meaning of the various acts includes unequal treatment

because of race, 60 color, 61 religious creed,62 ancestry,6 3 national origin, 64 age, 65 and,
in one case, draft eligibility. 66 The intended scope of most of these acts, however, is
broader than just union membership. They have as their purpose the general elimination
of discrimination in the industrial community. 67 Not only "labor organizations," but also
"employers" and "employment agencies" are included within the groups affected by
the statutes. 68 Normally, the acts contain a provision for the establishment of a commission for the investigation of discriminatory practices in the state and for the hearing
of complaints stating particular instances of discrimination: 69 Some states limit the
70
jurisdiction of the commission to discrimination as alleged in a specific complaint,
7
while others do not. ' The sanctions provided to enforce the acts vary. Some provide
for fines. 7 2 Others have provisions for the issuance of cease and desist orders.73 And
74
Most also
a few grant the commission power to order "restoration" of membership.
75
provide for judicial review of the proceedings.
D.

FederalLegislation

In the area of federal legislation, the problem of union membership practices has
arisen in several contexts. Acting under the Wagner Act of 1935,76 the National Labor
Relations Board frequently threatened to revoke certification because of a union's refusal
to grant equal status to all the employees in the bargaining unit for which it was the exclusive representative. 77 Although cogent arguments were made that the Board possessed
no decertification power, 78 the question remained moot, since apparently the Board
never attempted to decertify a union on these grounds.
The enactment of the Taft-Hartley Act in 194779 failed to change the picture. If
anything, it strengthened the arguments running contrary to the Board's prior posi60 Statutes cited supra note 54.
61 Ibid.
62 Ibid.
63 Statutes cited supra note 54 with the exception bf New Mexico, Oregon, and Minnesota.
64 Statutes cited supra note 54 with the exception of New Mexico.
65 Three states make this provision. MASS. ANN. LAws ch. 151 B, § 1(8) (1957) (45-65 yrs.);
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 954(h) (Supp. 1957). (40-62 yrs.); R.I. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 6, § 1, 3
(1956) (45-65).
66 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18:25-3 (Supp. 1958).
67 It should be noted, however, that the courts and the legislatures in this area are concerned
primarily with the worker's right to employment, and that this concern only incidentally gives rise
to the recognition of a right to join the union. Although in many-situations one is tantamount to
the other, the basic interests, and hence the rights being protected, still remain distinct. The courts
and legislatures are only beginning, unfortunately, to recognize the importance of union membership
independent of the right to equal opportunity in employment.
68 See, e.g., N.Y. Exacu'rvEv LAW § 292(5) (9).
69 See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 7404(f) (1949).
70 See, e.g., Wis. STAT. ANN. § 111.36(3) (Supp. 1959).
71 See, e.g.$ N.Y. EXEcuTrvE LAW § 297.
72 See, e.g., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 961 (Supp. 1958).
73 See, e.g., Colo. Sess. Laws 1957, ch. 176, § 6(10).
74 See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 7407(a) (1949), as applied in International Bhd. of Elec.
Workers, Local 35 v. Commission on Civil Rights, 140 Conn. 537, 102 A.2d 366 (1953). The court
ordered the applicant admitted into the union, but the local refused to comply. Subsequently, the
Commission obtained a contempt order against the local, in which a fine of $1,000 was levied. The
order also directed that the local be fined $250 a week as long as the non-compliance continued.
AARON, THE EMPLOYMENT RELATION AND THE LAW 73 (1957).
75 See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 49.60.270 (1957).
76 National Labor Relations Act, 49 Stat. 499 (1935), 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1952).
77 Bethlehem-Alameda, Inc., 53 N.L.R.B. 99, 1016 (1943); Carter Mfg. Co., 59 N.L.R.B. 804,
806 (1944); Southwestern Portland Cement Co., 61 N.L.R.B. 1217, 1219 (1945); Atlantic Oak
Flooring Co., 62 N.L.R.B. 973, 975 (1945).
78 See the dissent of Justice Jackson in Wallace Corp. v. NLRB, 323 U.S. 248, 257 (1944).
79 Labor Management Relations Act, 61 Stat. 136 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 141 (1952).
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tion.80 The act's primary concern has been with the protection of the worker's right to

continue or to obtain employment independent of union membership. 8 ' "Congress apparently felt that arbitrary restrictions upon admission to union membership . .. [was
a matter] of public concern only if the ... result . . . [were] loss of employment." 82
Cases which have arisen under the Railway Labor Act83 fail to paint a substantially
different picture. Under this act, the majority in a particular work unit have the right
to determine who will be the bargaining representative of the unit.8 4 The Supreme
Court, in the leading case of Steele v. Louisville & N. R.R., 85 has interpreted this provision as imposing on the representative the duty of bargaining without discrimination
for all of the members of the unit regardless of their lack of union affiliation, while
still recognizing the union's right to determine eligibility for its membership.
Pursuant to the Steele doctrine, the courts have given protection to minorities
against discriminatory bargaining in a number of cases. 8 6 But to date, the courts, on
the basis of federal law, have not interfered with union membership policies and practices. The recent case of Oliphant v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen87 is illustrative. Two Negro firemen, excluded from the Brotherhood, contended, inter alia, that
the only effective way to guarantee them equal representation was to grant them equal
participation in the union. The court responded that there was no provision in the act
requiring that membership in the exclusive bargaining agent be available to all. Considered in the light of the act itself,8 8 and its legislative history,89 this response seems
fully justified. The conclusion is thus valid, that: "The plain fact is that the Railway
Labor Act imposes . . . no regulation upon . . . the . . . matter of admission to
membership." 90
E. FederalConstitutionalSafeguards
An excluded worker's plea that he has been arbitrarily excluded from union membership, and thus has been deprived of a constitutional right, is by no means novel. The
only possible constitutional basis, however, for compelling a union to accept all reasonably qualified applicants is the due process clause of the fifth amendment and the
equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. And a necessary prerequisite
80

The proviso to Section 8(b)(1) of the act states:

Provided, that this paragraph shall not impair the right of a labor organization
to prescribe its own rules with respect to the acquisition or retention of mem-

bership therein.
Section 8(b)(2) of the act states that it is an unfair labor practice to discriminate against
a worker denied union membership for reasons other than failure to tender dues or initiation fees.
81

This provision goes to the protection of a worker's employment; it does not recognize any right to

union membership.
82

Aaron & Komaroff, Statutory Regulation of Internal Union Affairs, 44 ILL. L. Rnv. 425,

447 (1949).
83 44 Stat. 577 (1926), as amended, 45 U.S.C. § 151 (1952).
84 45 U.S.C. § 152 (Fourth) (1952).
85 323 U.S. 192, reversing Steele v. Louisville & N.R.R., 245 Ala. 113, 16 So. 2d 416 (1944).
86 See, e.g., Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Howard, 343 U.S. 768 (1952); Richardson v.
Texas & N.O.R.R., 242 F.2d 230 (5th Cir. 1957); Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957); Chirico
v. Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen, Lodge 1047, 167 F. Supp. 635 (S.D.N.Y. 1958).
87 156 F. Supp. 89 (N.D. Ohio), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 893 (1957), afl'd, 262 F.2d 359 (6th
Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 935 (1959).
88 See 44 Stat. 577 (1926), as amended, 45 U.S.C. § 152 (Eleventh)(a) (1952) which apparently recognizes that membership may be restricted, if it does not interfere with employment.
See also Steele v. Louisville & N.R.R. 323 U.S. 192, 204 (1944) where Mr. Justice Stone remarks
that "the statute does not deny to such a bargaining labor organization the right to determine
eligibility to its membership .. "
89 Senator Jenner of Indiana proposed an amendment to the act subsequent to its passage to
prohibit the certification of a union which denied membership on the basis of race or color. However, the proposal was tabled and did not become a part of the act, apparently indicating that
Congress was satisfied with the current interpretation of the act. 96 CoNG. REc. 16377-78 (1951).
90 Aaron &Komaroff, supra note 82 at 438.
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92
91
for their application in a particular situation is the finding of "federal" or "state"
93
action. The constitution erects no shield against mere "private" action.
The Ross 9 4 case is indicative. of the attitude most courts have taken toward the
plea that discrimination by a labor union partakes of "state" action within the meaning
of the "fourteenth amendment. These courts have flatly rejected the contention. Consistent with the voluntary association rationale, which invariably has been applied to
labor unions, it is difficult to see how a contrary result could be reached.
The fifth amendment, however, has posed a somewhat more difficult problem. In
the Oliphant case, 95 it was contended that certification, pursuant to a federal statute,
as an exclusive bargaining agent transformed the nature of a union from a voluntary
association into a quasi-federal agency. The court, while sympathizing with the Negroes,
felt that it could not find the necessary federal action without usurping the legislative
function. The Kansas Supreme Court, however, in Betts v. Easley,9 6 reached a contrary
result. There the defendant local, although certified as the exclusive bargaining agent
of all the workers, refused to admit Negroes. The court found that "the acts complained
of are those of an organization acting as an agency created and functioning under
provisions of Federal law."19 7 Consequently, the court felt itself agreeably constrained
to hold that the union's actions were violative of the plaintiff's constitutional rights.

F. Conclusion
Quantitatively, the problem of discrimination in the labor movement is not large. The
great majority of unions freely admit to membership all applicants regardless of race,
creed, national origin, or ancestry. The fact remains, however, that some unions, particularly in the building trades and in the railway brotherhoods, do follow discriminatory
practices. Viewed in the light of the democratic commitments of our society, the problem
thus posed is how best to eliminate these practices.
Consistent with the voluntary association rationale, it is difficult to see how a court
can compel a union to admit even an abitrarily excluded applicant. And, where it has
occurred, it is interesting to note that the court invariably is protecting the worker's
right to employment, rather than attempting to guarantee him equal citizenship, through
union membership, in his industrial community. Unfortunately, the courts have tended
to evaluate the indivdual worker's needs solely on an economic basis, and have ignored
the broader social and political needs of a human person maturing in an industrial
society. The same criticism holds true of the state legislation passed to deal with this
problem, though such criticism must be tempered by the fact "that these laws have
reduced discrimination in employment and have opened up opportunities to minorities
barred from certain.., industries." 98
Perhaps the best solution to the problem would be the abandonment of the voluntary association rationale, and the development of a new body of jurisprudence, focusing
primarily on the labor union as a unique institution. But realistically speaking, it is
doubtful that this will take place on any large scale. Courts have demonstrated a
natural reluctance to abandon the often-recited and time-honored rule.
The problem is further complicated since the labor movement is actually a nationwide phenomena. Efforts made by any one court, or single legislature, would be at best
only patch work. What the situation requires is a comprehensive, national treatment.
91 Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
92 Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
93 Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 11 (1889).
94 Ross v. Elbert, 275 Wis. 523, 82 N.W. 2d 315 (1957). See text at note 48, supra.
96 Oliphant v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen, 156 F. Supp. 89 (N.D. Ohio), cert. denied,
355 U.S. 893 (1957), afl'd, 262 F.2d 359 (6th Cir. 1958), cert denied, 359 U.S. 935 (1959).
96 161 Kan. 459, 169 P.2d 831 (1946).
97
98

Id. at 838.

S. Doc. No. 15, 83rd Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1953).
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Such a treatment could be achieved through the vehicle of constitutional interpretation.
The arguments that union discrimination constitutes either state or federal action within
the meaning of the constitution are extremely compelling, though they have been generally rejected. Upon closer analysis, however, one is forced to agree that: "The implications of calling labor unions governmental instrumentalities are not easy to perceive,
but surely the designation would invite more and more regulation with consequent
loss of independence." 99 The development of the complete person is best achieved in
an atmosphere where the institutional arrangement of the society is based upon principles
of individual freedom and associational autonomy. Regulation, as opposed to mere
supervision, tends to weaken the vitalizing effects of these principles.
Perhaps, then, the best, and most realistic, solution to the problem would be
amendments to presently existing federal legislation. Both the Taft-Hartley Act' 00 and
the Railway Labor Act' 0 ' should be amended to provide that no union could be
certified unless it filed with appropriate authorities a copy of its constitution, containing
a provision that all persons, otherwise qualified, would be eligible for membership regardless of race, color, national origin, or ancestry. The acts should also be amended
to grant any aggrieved party the right to enforce the provisions in appropriate federal
courts. Such amendments would thus be supervisory rather than regulatory in nature,
and would eliminate discrimination in a manner specifically designed to maintain union
integrity and independence - by placing the responsibility for their, implementation
and enforcement on the individual and the union.
III. UNION DISCIPLINE
The power needed to maintain an effective organization is also potentially the
power to oppress. The modern trade union existing in our complex industrial society,
however, needs the power to control its members if it is to fulfill its obligations under
the collective bargaining agreement. Wildcat strikes, dissidence fostered for internal
political reasons, and other divisive actions, since they undermine the very existence of
the union, must be dealt with and controlled. To behave as a responsible institution in
our society, the unions need the power to penalize and expel. 10 2 Yet the exercise of
this power, and its possible abuse, raises problems of the civil rights of its membership
of the highest importance. 103
Quantitatively, the problem of union discipline is not large. Although it is relatively impossible to obtain precise data on the exercise of union discipline, the problem
is not purely academic. 10 4 The number of cases is, however, small in proportion to the
number of members, and the actual exercise of the disciplinary power is unusual in a
majority of locals.' 05 But it is important to realize that mere statistics are not the
measure of justice. Each case represents a moment of crisis in a person's life, and its
ultimate resolution has effects not only on the individual before the tribunal, but also
on his dependents.
The question is thus posed: How does the individual union member fare under
the exercise of this disciplinary power? It is the purpose of this section to investigate
this problem, and to see what, if any, legal remedies are available to the unjustly
disciplined member.
99 Cox, Union Democracy, 72 HARv.L. Rav. 609, 620 (1959).
100 Labor Management Relations Act, 61 Stat. 136 (1947), 49 U.S.C. § 141 (1952).
101 44 Stat. 577 (1926), as amended, 45 U.S.C. § 151 (1952).
.
102 The court in Sanders v. International Ass'n of Bridge Workers, 130 F. Supp. 253, 258 (W.D.
Ky. 1955) aptly notes:
A labor union is a democratic institution. It is a self-governing body . ..
[which] to fulfill its functions and protect the rights of its members . . . must
have the authority through its governing body to classify and discipline its
membership.
103 For an excellent discussion of the relation between union power and union repsonsibility, see
TANNENBAUM, A Pnn.osoPnY OF LABoR 155-75 (1951).

104

105

Summers, Legal Limitations on Union Discipline, 64 HARV. L. REv. 1049-50 (1951).
Summers, DisciplinaryPowers of Unions, 3 IND.& LA., RE.L. Rev. 486 (1950).

NOTES
A. Union ConstitutionalProvisions
In any consideration of union affairs, perhaps the most important single document
is the union's constitution. It represents the union's supreme law in governing its relations with its members, and normally it states the various acts which will subject its
members to disciplinary action, their corresponding penalties, and procedures for trial
and appeal.10 8 The offenses numerated in the average constitution vary with the nature
of the industry organized. The Lithographers, for example, do not permit the use of
chromic acid, a substance injurious to the health of those using it, which was at one
time employed in many segments of the industry.10 7 The Machinists, on the other hand,
provide for fine or expulsion for a refusal to do rough or dirty work.' 08 Despite this
diversity, certain patterns or themes are discernible. Almost all constitutions make some
provisions in regard to dues, and provide for penalties when the member becomes two
or three months in arrears. 109 Many also regulate conditions of employment,1 0 and
a few even attempt to regulate personal behavior."' Most constitutions also provide
penalties for dual unionism. 112 One actually outlaws "racketeering." '" s Almost all restrict in some form, usually under the guise of provisions against slander, intra-union
criticism of union policies. 114 And, a few have attempted to restrict the exercise of the
member's rights within the society at large.1 5
By and large, however, the disciplinary provisions of most constitutions are of an
all-inclusive nature. They prohibit conduct which is "disloyal," "unbecoming a union
member," "causes dissension," or which is "detrimental to the best interest of the
union." 1 6 Most of these provisions were writen years ago by men unskilled in the com-plexities of law, who could- see little reason for specifying what was to be expected of
each member. Yet, while their historical origin makes their presence understandable,
their continuing existence remains objectionable. Their vague nature makes ex post facto
justice possible, 117 and effective and meaningful interpretation of the constitution by
the member and the courts is rendered relatively impossible. 118
The procedural provisions in union constitutions for deciding disciplinary cases
very almost as much as the enumerated offenses themselves. Some unions specify a
multitude of rules, 11"9 while others merely require that the member receive a "fair
trial.' 120 Normally, the charges must be made in writing and notice served on the
106 Some union constitutions do not contain disciplinary provisions. Only twenty-four unions,
however, with a declared membership of 756,756, or 4.3% of all unionized labor, fit into this
category. HNDBoox p. 65.
107 Amalgamated Lithographers of America, CONsT., art. XXXIX, § 1-4a p. 50 (1958).
108 International Ass'n of Machinists, CONST., art. J. § 4, p. 76 (1958).
109 See, e.g., Granite Cutters Int'l Ass'n of America, CONST., § 67, pp. 63-67 (1956).
110 See, e.g., Bricklayers Int'l Union of America, CONST., art. X, § 1-4, pp. 40-41 (1956) (hours
per day).
III See, e.g., International Ass'n of Machinists, CoNs-., art. J,.§ 9, p. 77 (1958) (intoxication).
112 See, e.g., Amalgamated Meat Cutters of North America, CoNST., art. U, § 3, p. L-22 (1956).
118 International Bhd. of Teamsters, CoNs?., art. XVIII, § 13 (a), p. 78 (1957).
114 See, e.g., United Hatters Int'l Union, CONST., art. XVII, § 1 (e), p. 62 (1956). For a more
complete discussion of this problem, see p. 420 infra.
115 The most usual provisions under this heading are those outlawing membership in the Communist Party, International Union of Operating Eng'rs, CONS?., art. XVI, § 4, p. 64 (1956); limiting
access to civil courts, International Photo Engravers Union of North America, CONST., art. XXI, §
1, p. 43 (1958); and interferring with the legislative objectives of the union, Brotherhood of Railroad

Trainmen, CONST., rule 27(b), (d), p. 170 (1955).

116 Approximately 51% of organized labor is governed by this type of provision, while only
about 25% is governed by specific provisions. 11% is governed by constitutions which fal to state
clearly any grounds for discipline, and 12% by constitutions which have no disciplinary provisions.
HANDoO, p. 66. For an excellent discussion of these clauses see Summers, supra note 105, at 505-08.
117

HANDBOOx, p.67.

118 Summers, Judicial Settlements of Internal Union Disputes, 7 Burssuo L. Rnv. 405, 416 (1958).
119 See, e.g., American Fed'n of Musicians, CONS"., arts. 7-8, pp. 54-63 (1956).
120 See, e.g., Boot & Shoe Worker's Union, CONST., § 75, p. 42 (1957).
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accused. 121 Approximately half of all unionized workers are subject to the disciplinary
action of only their local, with the international
having appellate jurisdiction, while the
122
remainder are under the jurisdiction of either.
After the charges are filed, the case is normally referred to a trial committee composed of fellow workers, although some unions refer it to the local executive board. 123
Naturally, where the local and international possess concurrent jurisdiction, the charge
normally determines the question of who will prosecute. A small
number of unions
124
provide for summary expulsion for particularly serious offenses.
Only a few unions fail to provide some appellate procedure, although very often
the right to appeal is reserved for more serious offenses. 125 Several constitutions state
that appeal must be taken in the form of a union-wide referendum, 12 6 while others
make the international executive board the body of final review. 127 The majority, however, provide for the ultimate appeal to the body of the international convention. 128 12 9
While in the great majority of cases the union member receives a fair trial,
union disciplinary procdures are not above criticism. Laymen are very often called upon
to decide emotionally-packed issues with no more concrete standard than the platitude
that the accused is to receive a "fair trial." The "layman is primarily concerned with
making up his mind, and the necessity for procedural techniques which will test and
weigh the evidence is often not recognized."' 30 This impatience with formalities is only
accentuated when the case involves such personally vital issues as strikebreaking.
An appeal to a higher body within the union will sometimes remedy these defects.
But most union disciplinary procedures have a more serious flaw, which, by its very
nature, cannot be remedied within the union itself. Basically, this defect is the lack of
an independent judiciary. The prosecuting and adjudicating functions are identified in a
monolithic structure.' 3 ' This defect becomes particularly patent when the offense is of
an intra-union political nature. Here, appeal to a higher body within the union will offer
little chance of a more impartial trial, since often it is the policy of the international
132
which forms the very substance of the charge.

121 See, e.g., Oil & Chemical Worker's Int'l Union, CONST., art. XII, § 2, p. 36 (1956). Failure to
comply with this type of provision in disciplining a member will result in court reversal of any conviction. See, e.g., Barnhart v. UAW, 12 N.J. Super. 147, 79 A.2d 88 (Sup. Ct. 1951) where the
court reversed an expulsion on grounds that since the charges made against the accused were not
filed with the Recording Secretary and signed by the complaining member as specified in the constitution, the union was without power to take disciplinary action.
122
123
124
125

HANDBOOK p. 69.
Id.
Id. at 71-72.
Id. at 70.

126
127

Approximately 98,600 union members are covered by this type of provigion. Ibid.
Thirty unions with approximately 3,051,797 members have this form of appeal. Ibid.
128 108 unions covering 11,465,718 members provide for this type of appeal. Ibid.
129 Summers, supra note 118, at 419.
130 Ibid. Recognizing the "Topsy" way in which union constitutions have tended to grow, a
number of unions have recently adopted handbooks for local trial procedure designed to insure the
member a fair trial. See, e.g., Trial Procedure Handbook for Local Unions, adopted by the International Executive Board of the Chemical Worker, June 8, 1958, on file in Notre Dame Law Library.
131 See generally, Niebuhr, The Future of Labor, The New Leader, August 26, 1957, pp. 3-4.
This defect has not passed unnoticed among the unions. The General Executive Board of the Upholsterers Int'l Union has aptly noted:
. . . the greatest weakness in the disciplinary procedures of . . . all . . .
Unions is our inability to guarantee a thoroughly unbiased objective tribunal of
Union members.
Furthermore, we also recognize . . . the possibility that because the judicial
machinery is so closely interlocked with the political administration by which laws
are made and policies formulated . . . that discipline . . . may be influenced by

132

political forces and considerations, even if not made a deliberate weapon of
political and administrative power. Democracy in the U.I.U., pp. 12-13,
pamphlet on file in Notre Dame Law Library.
The Steel Workers Convention of 1958 offers an excellent illustration of this point.

NOTES
Two unions have apparently found an answer to this problem. The UAW and the
UIU have established "extra-union" appeal boards, to which imparitial, prominent
persons are appointed.' 33 This system attempts to guarantee the member an unbiased
trial within the union governmental structure by the establishment of a truly independent
judiciary. Such a practice, where the factor of cost is not prohibitive, ought to be
adopted by all unions.
Various penalties are imposed where the final decision is adverse to the member.
The most common are fines, suspensions, and expulsions,' 34 but in special cases other
means of discipline are used. Sometimes the member is barred from attending meetings
or holding office, a particularly effective discipline where its purpose is to silence
internal opposition.' 3 5 The ultimate effect of discipline, however, is not to be measured
solely in terms of its severity on the individual member, but also in terms of its effect
on the local as a whole. The expulsion of one person may effectively silence a group.
B. Judicial Considerationof Union Discipline
When a member is unjustly disciplined, does he possess any judicial remedy? As
stated before, historically, labor unions were classified as voluntary associations, which
placed them in the same category as churches and fraternal groups.' 36 Because of long
judicial experience with family fights in various religious and fraternal associations, the
courts had adopted a policy of non-intervention, and this same policy was initially
practiced in reference to labor organizations.' 3 7 But soon the courts realized that labor
kiions weie exercising extensive power, sometimes abusively, over the lives of their
members. Some judicial intervention was necessary.
Justification for intervention was found in several theories which the courts were
quick to develop. An English court in Rigby v. Connal'38 first rationalized that the
intervention was necessary to protect the member's property rights. Soon this new theory
found acceptance in American jurisprudence. Citing the Rigby case as authority, the
court in Fraelich v. Musicians Mut. Benefit Ass'n affirmed the position that intervention
finds its "sole purpose . . . [in] protecting an interest the member may have in the
property of the association."'14039 Although supplemented in some respect, the property
theory is still followed today.
The precise nature of the union member's "property" rights, however, is not clear.
He has nothing that he can sell, assign, or leave to his heirs. By traditional notions of
property, it really cannot be said that the member has a "property" right. But perhaps
133 The UIU review Board was established in 1954. The first members of the board were:
Archibald Cox, Harvard Law School, chairman; Nathan Feinsinger, University of Wisconsin Law
School; Paul Herzog, Harvard School of Public Administration; Rev. Leo Brown, St. Louis
University; J. Benton Gillingham, University of Washington Institute of Labor Economics; Rev.
Dennis Comey, Institute of Industrial Relations of St. Joseph's College; Clark Kerr, University of
Wisconsin; Honorable Curtis Bok, Philadelphia, Pa.; and Joseph Lohman, Illinois State Parole
Commission. The UAW appeal board was established in 1957. The first members of the board
were: Rabbi Morris Adler of Detroit, Michigan; Monsignor George Higgins of Washington, D.C.;
Clark Kerr and Edwin Witte, University of Wisconsin; Honorable Wade H. McCree of Detroit; and
Bishop G. Bromley Oxnam of Washington, D.C. Wellington, Union Democracy and Fair Representation: FederalResponsibility in a FederalSystem, 67 YALE L. J. 1349 n.113 (1958).
134

HANDBooK p. 65.

135 See, e.g., Miller v. International Union of Operating Eng'rs, 118 Cal. App. 2d 66, 257 P.2d
85 (1953) where several union members were fined and suspended by the union for publishing slanderous remarks about the International President, but on the condition that if the fines were paid, the
sentences would be suspended without right of the accused to attend meetings or participate in
other internal affairs of the union. The court affirmed the union's conviction on the grounds it was
supported by substantial evidence.
130 See generally, Chafee, The Internal Affairs of Associations Not for Profit, 44 HArv. L REv.
991 (1930).
137 Summers, supra note 104, at 1050-51.
138 [1880] 14 Ch. D. 482.
'39 93 Mo. App. 383, 390 (1902).
140 See, e.g., Bires v. Barney, 43 Cal. 2d 56, 277 P.2d 751 (1954).
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what most courts mean by "property" right is substantially what the court in Fleming
v. Moving Picture Machine Operators said: "the membership [itself] is the valuable
property right."'141
At any rate, the courts have also developed a supplementary rationale, realizing,
perhaps, the inadequacies of the property theory. In Lawson v. Hewell,142 a case involving a Masonic order, the court advanced the notion that members of a voluntary
association have with one another a "contractual" relation, defined by the rules of the
organization, and that the member's "property" interest is only incidental to his membership. This new rationale was subsequently applied to a trade union in Senetherban v.
Laundry Washers,148 and is today the accepted law.144 This new development assigns
to each theory a special function: intervention is based on the property interest, and the
contract-constitution provides a standard for adjudication. 145
Like the property theory, the contract rationale is susceptible to analytical criticism.
The courts have attempted to fit a new situation into an old category, and the stress
shows. The "contract" lacks clearly ascertainable parties. The constitution is usually
thought to be a contract between the members and the association, and between the
individual members themselves.' 46 But since the union is often not considered a legal
entity, its ability to contract is questionable, 147 and the notion of a contract between a
million persons is somewhat incredible, especially when almost every convention results
in a modification of its "terms." Also, most provisions, especially those concerned with
discipline, hardly meet the basic requirement of definiteness. Further, where a member
works in a union or closed shop, it is difficult to see any meaningful mutual assent.' 48
One is forced to conclude that "the contract theory is but a technique for judicial intervention."'149 Ultimately, however, the present theories should stand or fall, not on the
basis of their logical consistency, but on their ability to provide the unjustly disciplined
member adequate relief.
How then are these theories applied by the courts to particular factual situations?
Following the contract rationale, the court will generally require the petitioning member
to exhaust his intra-union appeals before permitting him to resort to the court.' 5 0 But
to this general rule the courts have grafted a variety of almost vitiating exceptions,
which may be grouped under two basic headings: (1) defects in original union jurisdiction, and (2) inadequacy of intra-union appeal. 151
141 16 N.J. Misc. 502, 1 A.2d 850, 853 (Ch. 1938). Accord, Lo Bianco v. Cushing, 177 N.J.
Eq. 593, 177 AtI. 102 (Ch. 1935).
142 118 Cal. 613, 50 Pac. 763 (1897). While Lawson is the earlier case, Krause v. Sanders, 66
Misc. 601, 122 N.Y. Supp. 54 (Sup. Ct. 1910) is usually regarded as the most prominent source of
the contract theory. Stone, Wrongful Expulsion from Trade Unions: Judicial Intervention at AngloAmerican Law, 34 CAN. B. R v. 1144 at n.12 (1956).
148 44 Cal. App. 2d 131, 111 P.2d 948 (1941).
144 Mr. Justice Frankfurter notes in International Ass'n of Machinists v. Gonzales, 356 U.S.
617, 618 (1958) that the "contractual conception of the relation between a member and his union
widely prevails in this country...."
145 Summers, supra note 104, at 1116.
146 See, e.g., Bush v. International Alliance of Theater Employees, 55 Cal. App. 2d 272, 130 P.2d
788 (1942). One state also has a statute providing that a duly adopted constitution constitutes an
enforceable contract, providing the member exhausts his internal remedies. IND. ANN. STAT., § 402803 (Supp. 1958).
147 See Williams v. United Mine Workers, 254 Ky. 520, 172 S.W.2d 202 (1943); Annot., 149
A.L.R. 505 (1944) (liability of an unincorporated association to suit).
148 But cf. Minch v. Local 37, Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs, 44 Wash. 2d 15, 265 P.2d 286,
291 (1953) where the court, failing to realize the vital differences between unions and "other"
voluntary associations, noted:
Undoubtedly, a union member, just as a member of any other voluntary
association, consents to be bound by union rules and to be disciplined for
infractions thereof.
149 Stone, supra note 142, at 1116.
150 See, e.g., Way v. Patton, 195 Ore. 36, 241 P.2d 903 (1952). See statute cited supra note 146.
151 The case law in this area is extremely difficult to synthesize. The synthesis offered here is
only one of many to be found. Compare, Summers, supra note 104, at 1086-92 with Stone, supra
note 142, at 1125-28.

NOTES
The first exception seems to suggest that if the proceedings are voidable, the exhaustion rule obtains, but if the proceedings are void, there being nothing to appeal
from, the courts will immediately hear the case. 152 Upon a closer analysis, however, it
the courts will intervene
appears that the exception is as broad as the rule.153 Apparently
54
whenever they feel the union has acted wrongfully!'

Generally if the trial body was improperly constituted, 155 the procedure unfair,15 6

or the offense not reasonably punishable, 157 the discipline is considered beyond the
union's jurisdiction, and the court will grant immediate relief.
The reasoning behind the second exception indicates that it is senseless to force a
member to exhaust his intra-union appeals where they will not afford him adequate
58
inherent futility in seeking
relief. Excessive delay before the appeal will be heard,'
1 59
and the court's power to entertain actions for damages rather than rean appeal,
instatement, 160 all constitute situations prompting the courts to make an exception to
the general exhaustion rule.
Once the court finally decides to weigh the merits of the appeal it will normally
consider two aspects of the case in determining the validity of the discipline. Procedurally, the courts apply a "substantial justice" test; while substantively, the courts
require that the constitutional provisions defining the offense not be contrary to

"public policy."

"Substantial justice" resists precise definition, but in terms of the cases, the concept
6
does acquire meaningful content. In Cason v. Glass Bottle Blowers Ass'n,' ' the court
stated that although technical court practices would not be required of union procedures,
they must be such as will afford the accused member substantial justice. The court then
proceeded to give meaning to "substantial justice" by including the right to be apprised
of the charges, to confront and cross-examine the accuser, and to examine and refute
that the member is entitled to have his case heard
the evidence. It would also 6 seem
2
before an impartial tribunal.'
Extending the notion of the illegal contract, substantively, certain constitutional
provisions may be held void as contrary to "public policy." There is little doubt, however, as to the union's power to make and enforce reasonable rules for the regulation of
its affairs. 163 And research has indicated that in recent years, reversal of union discipline
Summers, supra note 104, at 1089.
But cf. Holderley v. International Union of Operating Eng'rs, Local 12, 45 Cal. 2d 843,
291 P.2d 463 (1955), apparently overruled by, Mooney v. Bartenders' Union, Local 284, 48 Cal.
2d 841, 313 P.2d 857 (1957).
154 Summers, JudicialSettlements of Internal Union Disputes, 7 BUFFALO L. REv. 405, 410 (1958).
155 See, e.g., Hopson v. National Union of Marine Cooks, 116 Cal. App. 2d 320, 253 P.2d 733
(1953) (trial body selected by lot and not by election).
156 See, e.g., Garner v. Newbert, 47 Ind. App. 183, 128 N.E. 704 (1920) (no notice or opportunity to be heard).
157 See, e.g., Leo v. International Union of Operating Eng'rs, Local 612, 26 Wash. 2d 498,
174 P.2d 523 (1946) (solicitation to join another union).
158 See, e.g., Madden v. Atkins, 4 N.Y.2d 288, 151 N.E.2d 73, 174 N.Y.S.2d 633 (1958) (appeal
not heard within six months); Gleason v. Conrad, 81 N.Y.S.2d 368 (Sup. Ct. 1940) (appeal lay to
convention held only once in five years).
159 See, e.g., Crossen v. Duffy, 90 Ohio App. 252, 103 N.E.2d 769 (1951) (appeal lay to executive
board which originally prosecuted charges).
160 See, e.g., International Printing Pressmen v. Zenith, 145 Tex. 399, 198 S.W.2d 729 (1947).
But cf. Binkowski v. Highway Truck Drivers, Local 107, 389 Pa. 116, 132 A.2d 281 (1957).
161 37 Cal. 2d 134, 231 P.2d 6 (1951); Annot., 21 A.L.R.2d 1397 (1952). Accord, Werner v.
International Ass'n of Machinists, 11 IM. App. 2d 258, 137 N.E.2d 100 (1956) (explusion upheld).
162 See, e.g., Madden v. Atkins, 4 App. Div. 2d 1, 162 N.Y.S.2d 576 (1957), aff'd on others
grounds, 4 N.Y.2d 288, 151 N.E.2d 73, 174 N.Y.S.2d 633 (1958).
163 See Taxicab Drivers, Local 889 v. Pittman, 322 P.2d 159, 164 (Okla. 1957) where the court
noted:
There can be no dispute concerning the authority of an organization such
as this Union to establish rules which permit disciplinary measures against
members who violate their reasonable provisions. Such associations have authority
to regulate the conduct of their members.
152
153
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on substantive rather than procedural grounds is a situation which seldom occurs.
In reviewing a union tribunal's finding of fact, the courts normally apply the substantial evidence rule. The courts will not re-weigh the evidence or substitute its judgment for that of the tribunal where the tribunal's finding has substantial support in
the evidence. 165 While this rule seems theoretically sound, it is subject to practical
criticism. The policy considerations which recommend it in administrative law, particularly the expertise of the tribunal, are almost totally lacking where unions are concerned. 1 66 Yet it apparently remains the general rule.
But the crucial question remains. How adequate are the remedies the unjustly
disciplined member can obtain? Universally it has been held that the petitioning member
can obtain reinstatement.' 67 Damages' 68 may also be awarded, not only for lost wages,
but also for mental suffering. 169
Still, compelling arguments can be made on behalf of the unjustly disciplined
member that damages and reinstatement are not always adequate remedies. Appeals,
both within and without the union, are expensive and time-consuming, and few members
have the financial reserves to carry them and their dependents through this critical
period. Thus, it may be legitimately asked whether the union member can prevent the
injury prior to its occurrence. Normally the member will be faced with the exhaustion
rule, unless he can bring himself within some well-recognized exception. 170 It does
seem, however, that a member ought to be able to obtain a temporary injunction as a
matter of course, staying the execution of the union's judgment pending appeals both
171
within the union and to the courts.
Reinstatement is usually achieved through a mandatory injunction ordering restoration of membership. 172 Some jurisdictions, however, permit the issuance of a writ
of mandamus. 173 Since the action sounds in contract rather than tort, the period within
which the action must be brought is governed by the contract statute of limitations.1 74

C. State Legislation
Several states have experimented with legislation dealing with union discipline,
although no state at present has any comprehensive legislation dealing with the subject.
Delaware and New Hampshire passed statutes in 1947, but repealed them in 1949.17
Colorado's one attempt at regulation was struck down in 1944 as unconstitutional since
it required as a part of the general scheme of regulation that all unions incorporate,
164 For an excellent synthesis of the cases, however, in which the courts have placed substantive limits on union discipline see Summers, supra note 104, at 1058-74.
165 See, e.g., Miller v. International Union of Operating Eng'rs, 118 Cal. App. 2d 66, 257
P.2d 85 (1953).
166 See text supra p. 396.
167 See, e.g., Madden v. Atkins, 4 N.Y.2d 288, 151 N.E.2d 73, 174 N.Y.S.2d 633 (1958).
168 See, e.g., International Ass'n of Machinists v. Gonzales, 356 U.S. 617 (1958). Prior to
Gonzales, there was some doubt as to the power of a state court to award damages where there
was a possibility that the wrongful expulsion might constitute an unfair labor practice under the
Labor Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley) 61 Stat. 156 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(2)
(1952). See Real v. Curran, 285 App. Div. 552, 138 N.Y.S.2d 809 (1955).
169 International Ass'n of Machinists v. Gonzales, supra note 168.
170 See text supra p. 398.
171 In Wilkins v. De Koning, 152 F. Supp. 306 (E.D.N.Y. 1957) the court did grant a temporary injunction preventing the union from taking disciplinary action against a member who had
consulted with his attorney about union welfare funds. The court, however, seemed to feel that if
the matter were routine discipline, the injunction ought not lie, and that the member would have
to exhaust his internal remedies before appealing to the courts.
172 See, e.g., Madden v. Atkins, 4 N.Y.2d 288, 151 N.E.2d 73, 174 N.Y.S.2d 633 (1958).
173 Hopson v. National Union of Marine Cooks, 116 Cal. App. 2d 320, 253 P.2d 733 (1953).
174

Ibid.

175 Summers, Legal Limitation on Union Discipline, 64 HARv. L. REv. 1049, 1097 nn. 235-36
(1951).

NOTES
and thus was a denial of both freedom of speech and assembly.1 7 6 Texas 177 and
Massachusetts 178 are the only states presently having statutes which purport to deal
with the problem.
The Texas statute provides, in substance, that a union member can be expelled
only for good cause, and that he must receive a fair hearing. It also provides that a
wrongfully expelled member can obtain reinstatement in the union. In short, the act
represents little more than a codification of existing case law.
The basic purpose behind the first Massachusetts statute,' 7 9 passed in 1888, is to
make incorporation possible for labor organizations, not to regulate their internal
affairs. After specifying the prerequisites to incorporation, however, the act does limit
the procedure under which a member can be expelled.' 8 0 The act further limits the
power of labor unions, incorporated or unincorporated, to fine its members.',8 However,
in 1947, Massachusetts passed a statute dealing with union discrimination against
employees.' 8 2 The statute, unfortunately, is keyed to a union or closed shop situation.
Review of union discipline is only permitted where the member is threatened with
possible discharge from his job, and even then, the standards for review are, like the
Texas statute, no more than a codification of existing case law.
D. FederalLegislation
Federal statutes do not present a substantially different picture concerning union
discipline. The Railway Labor Act' 83 fails to mention the question, and the TaftHartley Act' 8 4 only mentions the problem incidentally. Section 8(b) (1) (A) of the act
recognizes "the right of a labor organization to prescribe its own rules with respect to
the... retention of membership." And, section 8(a) (2) (B) of the act attempts to give
some protection to the worker's right to employment, independent of union membership,
by providing that an employer cannot justify discrimination toward employees if he has
reasonable grounds to believe that the membership in the union was terminated on some
basis other than the failure to pay dues and initiation fees. The act does not, however,
attempt to deal with union discipline itself.
Apparently then, "the protection of union members in their rights as members from
arbitrary conduct by unions and union officers has not been undertaken by federal
law ....

."185

E. Conclusion
The exercise of the disciplinary power in most locals is unusual, and in the great
majority of cases where it is exercised the member receives a fair trial. Yet the presence
of the power and the possibility of its abuse, coupled with the gravity of the effect of
even isolated abuses, pose problems which merit consideration. That the power is necessary to the proper functioning of the union is clearly demonstrable. Our concern, therefore, should be not with eliminating this power, but with safeguarding the rights of the
individuals who are or may be affected by its exercise.
178 CoLo. STAT. ANN. ch. 97, §94(20) (4) (J) (Supp 1950), declared unconstitutional, AFL v.
Reilly, 113 Colo. 90, 155 P.2d 145 (1944).
177 TEx REv. Civ. STAT.ANN.§§ 5152-5154(f) (1947).
178 MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 180, §§ 15-19 (1955); MAss.ANN.LAWS ch. 150A, §§ 4,6A (1957).
179 MAss. ANN.LAws ch. 180, §§ 15-19 (1955).
180 MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 180, § (1955) provides: "No member of such corporation shall be
expelled by vote of less than a majority of all members thereof, nor by vote of less than three
quarters of the members present and voting upon such expulsion."
181 Mss.ANN. LAWS ch. 180, § 19 (1955) (must be reasonable and for legal purpose).
182 MAss. ANN.LAws ch. 150A, § 6 (1957).
183 44 Stat. 577 (1926), as amended, 45 U.S.C. § 151 (1952).
184 Labor Management Relations Act, 61 Stat 146 (1947) 29 U.S.C. § 141 (1953).
185 International Ass'n of Machinists v. Gonzales, 356 U.S. 617, 619 (1958).
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Approaching the problem through the voluntary-association rationale and utilizing
the property and contract theories, the courts, independent of federal or state legislation,
have generally reached satisfactory results. The basic problem in the area of union discipline today, moreover, is one of procedure, not one of substance. This is demonstrated
by the lack of cases in recent years in which the objection to the action of the union
was based on the substantive nature of the charge brought against the accused. It seems,
however, that procedural objections to union discipline will be an ever-recurring problem, since what constitutes a fair trial is ultimately keyed to a particular fact situation.
It is sufficient to note, though, that general standards of "due process" or "substantial
justice" as used by the courts seem adequate to cope with the situation.
The major criticism of the courts, then, in the area of union discipline, does not
center around what they have done, but around the theories being used to explain their
decisions. However appropriate the voluntary-association classification was when the
trade union first appeared, today it is clearly an anachronism. Nor can a union constitution be considered a contract in any meaningful sense of the term. Clearly, as it was
recently noted:
Legal concepts which may have been sufficient to define the relationship of a
fraternal society or other mere voluntary association to its members are neither
adequate nor realistic to define the relationship of a trade union to its members. Any
attempt to apply such concepts serves only to restrict the courts in forming principles
based upon the developing customs and mores of this field of human activity. Rigidity
in the law is not desirable but flexibility and adaptability to new conditions are
essential to its growth.186
But simply to criticize and point out the obvious is not enough. It is incumbent
upon one who objects to offer an alternative course of action. Such an alternative approach may be found in a recent Canadian case. The Court of Appeal of Manitoba in
Tunney v. Orchard'8 7 was faced with a situation involving the expulsion of a milk
driver from a local of the International Brotherhood of Teamsters. The court found
that the local executive board flouted all rules of "justice," "fair play" and "natural
decency" in expelling the driver. 88 Such an interference with the accused's status as a
189
So
member of the local constituted, in the opinion of the court, an actionable tort.
holding, the court aptly noted: "The judges found it possible to move from property to
contract to meet the exigencies of the times. The step from contract to status is not
more revolutionary."1 90
The advantages gained from treating union membership as a "status" relationship
are manifest. It offers a more flexible concept to deal with a rapidly developing area of
the law. Once rid of the theoretical strait-jackets of property and contract, the courts
would be free, for instance, to articulate a meaningful standard for judicial supervision.
Contract law is too often tied to recognition of economic interests only. The interests a
union member has in his union run the whole gamut of the human personality. Freed of
the limitation of the old approach, the courts would be encouraged to show that, not only
the union's constitution, but also the needs of the human personality in the industrial
community as they are embodied in public policy, limit union power over the individual
union member. Further, the recognition that union membership is in reality a status
relationship which, if unreasonably interfered with, constitutes an actionable tort against
the erring official, would better serve to deter arbitrary union action. Few union officials
would risk the possibility of a suit of this nature.
186 Crawford & Stone, Comment on Orchardv. Tunney, 36 CAN. B. REv. 107 (1958).
187 (1955) 15 West. Weekly R. 49 (Man. C.A.).
188 Id. at 70.
189 However, on appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada, the Court refused to hold that union
membership constitutes a status relationship, although they affirmed the Court of Appeal in its
holding that the executive board's interference with the driver's membership constituted an actionable tort. It also refused to hold the union itself liable for the damages as the Court of Appeal
had done. Orchard v. Tunney, [1957] Can. Sup. Ct. 437, 8 D.L.R.2d 273 (1957).
190 Tunney v. Orchard, (1955) 15 West. Weekly R. 49, 76 (Man. C.A.).

NOTES
Perhaps one final word is necessary. Two bills191 presently before Congress offer
another solution to the problem of union disciplinary power. Both bills set out a multitude of rules with which union disciplinary action would be required to conform. Such
federal legislation is clearly unnecessary. Even in terms of the contract and property
theories presently being used, the courts are dealing with the situation in a satisfactory
manner. Both bills seem to ignore the proposition that democratic unionism cannot be
legislated. Government's best role in this area is one of supervision, not detailed
regulation. The passage of such legislation, particularly in the face of the present state
of case law, could only result in a devitalization of trade union democracy through
excessive governmental interference.
UNION WELFARE, PENSION, AND GENERAL FuNDs
Until approximately two decades ago the primary sources of money handled by
labor organizations were initiation fees, dues, fines and assessments collected from their
members. Where the local was a member of a parent labor union, portions of these
all
funds were tendered to the parent organization, 19 2 and any remaining amount in the case of an independent local - remained in the local's treasury to pay for the
operation of the association. That the amount of money thus accumulated on both
levels, the local and the parent, is quite considerable is readily apparent. 193 However,
in recent years our economic scene has witnessed a phenomenal growth of another
source of union funds: the welfare and pension plans. It is the employee's interest in
these funds that provides the subject matter of this inquiry. The primary emphasis of
the study will be upon the protections afforded these interests.
The economic and social significance of these accumulations is illustrated by the
amount of their total reserves and the number of people protected by welfare and
pension programs. Estimates place the total accumulated assets of these funds near 34
billion dollars, and indicate that they are increasing by the incredible amount of four
billion dollars each year.' 94 Additionally, the number of people covered by the intricate
network of these plans, the workers and their dependents, approaches seventy-five
million - or nearly one-half the population of the United States.' 9 5
The remarkable growth of these funds is seen from the fact that pension and
welfare plans were minimal until about 1942, those then in existence were being
financed entirely by dues and assessments of union members.' 98 By 1954 they had
reached an accumulated wealth of 20 billion dollars' 9 7 and one economist noted that at
this time, "uninsured corporate pension funds purchased more common and preferred
stock than such financial giants as the life insurance companies, property and liability
insurance companies, and open-end investment companies."' 198 In 1956 the Securities
and Exchange Commission pointed out that pension fund reserves were the largest
single source of equity capital. 199 It is predicted that these reserves will increase until
IV.

19' S. 1137, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959); HR. 4473, 86th Cong.,.lst Sess. (1959).
192 This amount is determined by the number of members in the local and is generally known
as a "per capita tax." See Plumbing and Pipe Fitting Ass'n, CONST. § 134, p. 64 (1956).
193
194

See Newsweek, April 8, 1957, pp. 33-34.
Levitan, Welfare and Pension Plans Disclosure Act, 9 LA.

L.. . 827, 828 (1958). It is
estimated that the total annual contributions to these funds approach $9 billion, and the benefits
paid under these plans are close to $5 billion a year.
195 Subcommittee on Welfare and Pension Funds of the Senate Committee on Labor and Public
Welfare, Final Report on Welfare and Pension Plan Investigation, S. Rep. No. 1734, 84th Cong., 2d
Sess. 6 (1956) [hereinafter cited as 1956 Final Rep.]. See generally Holland, The Pension Climate,
10 N.Y.U. ANN. CONF. LAB. 1 (1957).
196 Dubinsky, Safeguarding Union Welfare Funds, American Federationist, July, 1954, p. 10
(reprinted in 100 CONO. REc. 10318 (1954). See Note, 29 ST. JOHN's L. Rv. 106 (1954) for an

excellent forecast of current legislation.
197 U.S. News &World Report, Sept. 24, 1954, pp. 129-30.
198 S. Rep. No. 1280, 84th Cong., 1st Seas. 95 (1955).
199 1956 FinalRep. 2.
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they reach about 80 billion dollars at which time
a balance will be achieved between
200
contributions and payments to the beneficiaries.
The factors causing such a rapid increase in these reserves are many. Two developments, occurring almost simultaneously during World War IJ, constituted the major
thrust of the programs. The first of these was the freezing of wages by Executive Order
No. 9250201 which, in effect, made it illegal for an employer to offer, or an employee to
bargain for, increased wages. Subsequently, the National War Labor Board decided that
contributions to benefit plans would not be an illegal increase of wages. 20 2 The second
major impetus was the Revenue Act of 1942,203 which provided that employer contributions to such benefit funds were tax-deductible. An additional factor developed in
1948 when the then recently amended National Labor Relations Act20 4 was interpreted
by the NLRB in the Inland Steel Co.205 case to mean that the employer would be guilty
of an unfair labor practice for refusing to bargain concerning pension plans if so requested by the employees or their representative. More general and subsisting forces
contributing to this growth of pension funds are the natural desires to insure against
the loss of income due to unemployment, sickness, accident, old age, or death, and to
meet the staggering cost of proper medical care. Lastly, of course, there is the financial
advantage that such protection is far more economical when secured on the group
rather than individual basis.
While the amount of capital accumulated by the unions through dues and other
assessments may seem minimal when compared to the accumulations in the welfare and
pension funds, it is still highly significant. Attesting to this is the fact that in April, 1957,
five of the largest representative unions, with a membership of nearly five million,
possessed an estimated wealth, derived from operating assessments, of approximately
143 million dollars. 206 Although the concern of the union member over the safeguards
of these general funds is perhaps not as intense as his concern for the welfare and
pension funds upon which he will be entirely dependent in time of sickness or old age,
he still is vitally interested in protecting this fund from being used for purposes other
20 7
than proper union expenditures, or from being dissipated through mismanagement.
A. Problemsand Abuses
Whenever great amounts of wealth are accumulated, opportunities for graft and
corruption in the management of this wealth are magnified and the probability of dissipation of funds by mismanagement looms larger than ever. That both of these problems
Levitan, supra note 194 at 828.
7 Fed. Reg. 7871 (1942). The President was acting pursuant to authority vested in him by
"An Act to Amend the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942," ch. 578, 56 Stat. 765 (1942), 5 U.S.C.
§ 911 (1952). See AARoN, THE EMpLOYmENT RELATION AND Tm LAW 694 (1957).
202 See Neenan, Pension Funds and the Equity Market, 7 LAB. L.J. 552 (1956). The employers
quickly availed themselves of such a procedure, as this was a means to attract and hold workers in
a scarce labor market.
203 Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 165, added by ch. 619, 56 Stat. 862 (now INT. Rnv. CODE OF 1954,
§ 401).
204 61 Stat. 136 (1947), as amended, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-88 (1952).
205 77 N.L.R.B. 1, aff'd, 170 F.2d 247 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 336 U.S. 960 (1949). The Board
found the term "wages," over which § 9(a) requires the employer to bargain in good faith, "must
be construed to include emoluments of value, like pension and insurance benefits which accrue to
employees out of their employment relationship." Accord, W.W. Cross & Co. v. NLRB, 174 F.26
875 (1st Cir. 1949).
206 See Newsweek, April 8, 1957, pp. 33-34. These five unions were the UAW, Steelworkers,
Teamsters, Ladies' Garment Workers and the International Association of Machinists.
207 See O'Connor v. Harrington, 136 N.Y.S.2d 881 (Sup. Ct. 1954), modified, 285 App. Div.
900, 138 N.Y.S.2d 1 (1955), where the union resolved to spend substantially all of the $53,000 in
its treasury to defend union officials who had been indicted for extortion and coercion. Plaintiff, after
successfully prosecuting an action to prevent such misapplication, made a motion for counsel fees.
The supreme court found him entitled to fees of $5,000, which was modified on appeal to $3,500. See
also Mooney v. Bartenders' Union Local 284, 48 Cal. 2d 841, 313 P.2d 857 (1957), where monthly
statements of union showed expenses exceeded income but gave no detailed explanation as to certain large outlays. Plaintiff was given permission to examine all financial records of the union.
200

201

NOTES
are of special concern not only to the union members but also the general public is
evidenced by recent investigations of a special subcommittee of the Senate,208 and the
publicity given the results of such hearings.
Cases of outright misappropriation of union funds have been found only in a small
minority of the unions, 20 9 although the notorious press coverage given the sub-committee
findings might lead one to conclude differently. It was, however, in this small percent of
the total unions that the investigations uncovered constant and flagrant abuse of union
funds, resulting in severe public indignation against unions generally.
The worst abuses found were invariably the result of improper control over both
the funds themselves and the trustees of the funds. The methods used to exploit these
funds are many and diverse, limited only by the ingenuity of the individual manipulator.
Included among these are cases of commingling operating and welfare funds, 210 use of
the funds for other than welfare purposes, such as payment of the personal expenses of
212
the party in charge,2 11 or favoritism in the payment of claims.
Another means favored by those who attempt to enrich themselves at the members'
expense is the placing of insurance, by plan administrators, in an insured plan, as
contrasted with a self-administered plan. 21 3 Since the placing of such funds with insurance companies is a multi-million dollar business, some companies offer lucrative
214
commissions or "kick-backs" to the administrators who favor them with their business.
Due to the fact that insurance commissions are the greatest in the first year and diminish
every year thereafter, some labor officials will change insurance companies every year
to take advantage
of these higher commissions. This procedure has been labeled
"switching."2 15 Also, some insurance companies make an allowance to the insured for
performing clerical services which must otherwise be maintained by the company. This
is then used as a guise for payments to the administrators for "services" which were
either not performed, or are normally performed by the policy-holder without reimbursement.2 16
The insidious nature of such practices becomes clear when it is realized that since
the operation of any welfare or pension plan is fixed as to the amount of contributions, 217
any increased cost of the plan due to such defalcations must be borne by the workers
208 After a presidential recommendation, this subcommittee was appointed by the Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare. See generally, Levitan, supra note 194, at 828.

1956 Final Rep. 17.
1956 FinalRep. 23.
211 In one particular local in Chicago, the union president had the workers pay their contributions to the welfare fund as dues; he commingled $30,000 of insurance dividends into union coffers
209
210

and used the funds for lavish gifts, personal trips to Europe, and other personal expenses. 1956
FinalRep. 23.

212 In a Houston local, $95,000 was collected from union members not belonging to this local
for an alleged welfare fund. From this, approximately $37,500 was paid out in benefits but to the
members of this Houston local only. The remainder was used for union business. 1956 Final Rep. 24.
213 1956 Final Rep. 25-26. The insured plan is one where the money contributed by both employer and employee is used to purchase an insurance policy from a licensed commercial carrier.
The choice of the insurance company is often made by the administrators. The insurance company,
in return for the premiums, assumes all responsibility for investments, undertakes the actuarial risks,
and guarantees the benefit payments.
Where the plan is self-administered, the administrators receive the contributions, determine how
such moneys shall be invested, make the actuarial computations, and keep all the necessary records.

See Note, Protection of Beneficiaries Under Employee Benefit Plans, 58 COLUm. L. Rav. 78 (1958).

214 Committee on Improper Activities in the Labor or Management Field, Interim Report, S.
REP. No. 1417, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 59 (1958) (hereinafter cited as 1958 Interim Rep.) It was disclosed that the broker for one union's health and welfare plan received in commissions for a
four-year period over one million dollars.
215 1956 Final Rep. 36.

1956 Final Rep. 32.
217 The amount the employer, or both employer and employee, must contribute is based on some
predetermined factor such as cents-per-hour or percentage-of-payroll basis. This is to be distinguished from the level-of-benefit plan in which the employer contracts to pay certain benefits after
the happening of specific contingencies. See Tilove, The Organization of a Pension Plan, 10 N.Y.U.
ANN.CoNF. LAB. 55 (1956).
216
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through reduced benefits. In a recent New York case where a welfare fund trustee was
indicted for accepting bribes given pursuant to his permitting another to place the
insurance, the court estimated such activity cost the union members $250,000.218 The
subcommittee investigations also uncovered scattered instances of abuse in the handling
of the general operating funds. 2 19 The committee report disclosed gross misappropriation
of funds, 220 gifts
and annuities to officials, exorbitant salaries and vacations at welfare2 21
plan expense.
The greatest danger to the interest of the member in the funds of his union, both
general and welfare, lies not in such isolated cases of wilful misappropriations, but
rather, in the risk that such funds will be dissipated by incompetence and mismanagement. This is notably true in benefit plans which are self-administered, 222 and particularly in the pension programs. 228 Examples of such dangerous ineptitude are failure
to keep accurate records,2 2422incurring
extravagant expenses, 22 5 and failure to make
6
sound actuarial computations.
Lastly, it should be emphasized that the investigations of these areas disclosed
that only a small minority of the unions have been infected with corruption. In the final
report of the subcommittee which examined welfare and pension plans it was stated:
Perhaps too little has been said of the many sound practices found in the great
majority of these plans and of the conscientious and ingenious efforts on the part of
industry, labor, insurance
and banking to bring benefits to scores of millions of em227
ployees at low cost. '

B. Controls
1) Union Constitutional Safeguards
The existing safeguards on the union member's interest in these funds shall be
examined first as to the internal controls of the unions. The laws and regulations by
which a labor organization is governed can be found in that union's constitution. The
courts, in deciding a controversy arising solely within the labor union, normally will
look first to the union's constitution, since the constitution has been held to be a contract
between the union officers and the members, 228 and should govern the rights and duties
of the parties to the contract.
Almost every constitution of the unions examined contained some provision for an
audit of the local's books, usually at least twice a year, with a report being submitted to
the office of the international.22 9 Similarly, it was required of the parent union that
their books be audited and in most23 cases
either the audit report or the financial state0
ment be sent to the individual local.
219 People v. Cilento, 1 App. Div. 2d 200, 149 N.Y.S.2d 14, 20, modified, 2 N.Y.2d 55, 138 N.E.
2d 137, 156 N.Y.S.2d 673 (1956).
219 1958 Interim Rep. 1.
220
1958 Interim Rep. 159: "The funds misappropriated in one union by two top-ranking officials
totaled $178,000 or about 18 percent of the union's entire intake in any one year."
221 1958 Interim Rep. 446.
222 See note 213 supra.
228 These, unlike welfare plans which deal with short-term risk, deal with long-term future contingencies. Deficiencies in the planning of the former are brought to the surface early in the plan's
operation when income does not meet expenses and adjustments may be made to equalize the two.
Pension plans, however, do not provide for immediate payments and if there is a future inability for
the funds to meet demands it will be too late, in most cases, to be corrected. See 1956 Final Rep. 47.
224 1958 Interim Rep. 5.
225 1956 Final Rep. 23.
226 See Melnikoff, Actuarial Bases: The Interest Rate, 10 N.Y.U. ANN. CoNF. LAB. 85 (1957).
227 1956 FinalRep. 17.
228 E.g., International Ass'n of Machinists v. Gonzales, 356 U.S. 617, petition for rehearing
denied, 357 U.S. 944 (1958). The concept of the contractual relationship between a member and
his union was recently adopted in England. Bonsor v. Musicians' Union, [1956] A.C. 104.
229 Textile Workers' Union, CoNsr., art. X, § 9(b), p. 15 (1958). "This committee shall examine and audit the books and records of the local union.., at least every three months....
280 International Printing Pressmen, CoNsT., vol. 1, art. I, § 4, pp. 15-16 (1956) (financial
statements); United Steelworkers of America, CoNS?., art. IV, § 20, p. 13 (1956) (copy of the
audit).
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Although such a required audit might appear to be an adequate safeguard of union
funds, a weakness discernible in many of the provisions is an optional procedure which
allows the trustee to perform the audit himself instead of having the examination conducted by a disinterested professional third party such as a certified public accountant.2 3 '
Under such an optional provision, wisely avoided in some constitutions,2 32 collusion
between the treasurer and the trustee is all that is required to allow for unmolested and
unwarranted diversion of funds. Even if the trustee is impeccably honest, it is, in most
cases, highly unlikely that he possesses adequate knowledge of accounting and auditing
to uncover any discrepancies.
The internal misgivings inherent in the handling of union funds have not gone
unnoticed by responsible unions and their leaders. Consequently, within the unions
23 3
themselves there have arisen such couriter-measures as the codes of ethical practices
23 4
and the investigations and/or expulsions of corrupt unions and union officials.
Still
the remedy afforded by these procedures has been slight when compared with the
seriousness of the possible harm, for many unions can afford to ignore any such threat
as expulsion and public castigation. There are, however, other means by which a
member's interest in the union funds can be protected, and it is in this direction that
the survey now proceeds.
2) JudicialSafeguards
The right of the courts to intervene and protect a member's interest in welfare and
pension funds has long been recognized. Generally this intervention will be based on one
of two fundamental principles. A number of jurisdictions have held these funds to be
in the nature of a trust, with the individual employee being the beneficiary. 23 5 Other
courts simply view the fund as a charitable trust, with the beneficiaries remaining
indefinite.2 3 6 Under this theory it is felt that the state has the primary responsibility
to enforce the performance of the trust, if so requested by a person with an interest
therein. 287 Some look upon this as a legal fiction, pointing out that the relief would be
23 8
indirect since the proper party plaintiff would be the attorney general of the state.
However, if a person can show a special interest he may elect to maintain the suit
23 9
himself.

231 See United Auto Workers, CONsT., art. 48, § 2, p. 107 (1957): "It shall be the duty of the
Trustee of each Local Union... to audit, or cause to be audited by a Certified Public Accountant,
the books and financial affairs of their Local Union quarterly... ." (Emphasis added.)
232 Amalgamated Lithographers of America, CONsT., art. XII, § 11, p. 818 (1958): "The Finance
Committee shall have all books and financial records audited by a Certified Public Accountant at

least once a year....
233
234

AFL-CIO Code of Ethical Practices, Pub. No. 50, Feb. 1957.
N.Y. Times, Feb. 15, 1957, p. 12, col. 3; id., Feb. 6, 1957, p. 1, col. 4; Id., Feb. 5, 1957, p. 19,

col. 1; Id., Feb. 4, 1957, p. 1, col. 1.
2385 Yonce v. Miners Memorial Hosp. Ass'n, 161 F. Supp. 178 (W.D. Va. 1958); cf. George v.
Haber, 343 Mich. 218, 72 N.W.2d 121 (1955).
236 Lewis v. Benedict Coal Corp., 259 F.2d 346, 355 (6th Cir. 1958); Van Horn v. Lewis, 79
F. Supp. 541 (D.D.C. 1948); In re Tarrant's Estate, 38 Cal. 2d 42, 237 P.2d 505 (1951).
237 See 4 ScoTT, TRusTs § 391 (2d ed. 1956). This enforcement has been the obligation of the
state as far back as 1601, and possibly before then. It was in that year Parliament enacted the
Statute of Charitable Uses. 43 Eliz., c. 4. States today have similar provisions. E.g., WIs. STAT. §231.34
(1955).
238 See Note, 58 COLUM. L. Rav. 78, 94 (1958); see, e.g., N.Y. Pans. PRop. LAw § 12(3); N.Y.
REAL Pace. LAW § 113(3).
239 See 4 ScoTT, TRusTs § 391, p. 2758 (2d ed. 1956), where it is stated: "A person who has a
special interest in the performance of a charitable trust can maintain a suit for its enforcement." In
those cases where the court has viewed the funds in light of a charitable trust, the attorney general
was not made a party in interest. See also Lundine v. McKinney, 183 S.W.2d 265 (Tex. Civ. App.
1944) where, although the court did not describe the funds as a charitable trust, they repudiated a
contention that a suit to appoint a receiver and to allow plaintiffs to audit the local's books could
be maintained only by the attorney general.
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Other courts have flatly rejected the comparison of such funds to trusts and based
their intervention on contract rights. 240 Under this view, one court held the employee
to have a "contractual right to this pension if and when he comes within the regulations
prescribed by the trustees." 241 It has also been held that each member of a union "has a
contractual right to have the assets and
property of the local union used for only those
2 42
purposes set forth in the constitution.
The courts were quick to establish judicial safeguards for the welfare and pension
funds, as they recognized the social and economic ramifications of the capital reserve
represented therein. In United Garment Workers v. Jacob Reed's Sons, 2 43 the court
expressed concern over these funds when it stated: "The Court considers such funds as
rather sacred and it is the purpose of the law that they be available when due under
the contract." 244 In another case this same district court clearly indicated the power of
judicial intervention for misfeasance on the part of the trustees, strongly suggesting that
the trustees would be held to the highest duty of care:
[W]henever the trustees use, directly or indirectly, the fund for a purpose other than
the sole and exclusive benefit of the employee-members, this court, when called upon,
will enjoin the trustees from making improper expenditure. The burdening of the fund
with undue administrative expenses or lush salaries for union officials will not be
tolerated ....A provision in the by-laws or regulations denying the employee-members
the right to resort to the courts to protect their beneficial interest in the fund is of no
legal effect.245

Such intervention by the judiciary has given the member of the union a potential
means of protecting his interest in the funds and enforcing his rights to them. When there
is a breach of the fiduciary trust, fraud, or arbitrary action on the part of the trustees,
the court may insure proper administration by these trustees within the terms of the
agreement, although it cannot actually administer the trust. 246 In one case where the
court found the plaintiff had met the qualifying requirements, it compelled the trustees
of the fund to pay him a retirement pension. 247 This court later denied recovery where
the trust provision required employment in the anthracite mines for twenty years as a
condition precedent, because though the applicant
had worked twenty-five years in the
24 8
mines, eight were spent in the bituminous field.

240

Hobbs v. Lewis, 159 F. Supp. 282 (D.D.C. 1958); Hurd v. Illinois Bell Tel. Co., 136 F. Supp.

125, 133 (N.D. IlM.1955).
241 Hobbs v. Lewis, supra note 240, at 286.
242 Seslar v. Union Local 901 Inc., 87 F. Supp. 447, 450 (N.D. Ind.), rev'd, 186 F.2d 403
(7th Cir.) (failure to show jurisdictional amount), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 940 (1951); cf. DeMille
v. American Fed. of Radio Artists, 31 Cal. 2d 139, 187 P.2d 769, 776, cert. denied, 333 U.S. 876
(1948), where the court noted, "Dues and assessments paid by members to an association become the
property of the association and any severable or individual interest therein ceases on such payment.
[Citing cases] As such property, they are subject to disbursement and expenditure by the association
in pursuit of the lawful object or objects for which they were designated to be expended."
243 83 F. Supp. 49 (E.D. Pa. 1949).
244 Id. at 52.
245 Upholsterers' Int'l Union v. Leathercraft Furniture Co., 82 F. Supp. 570 (E.D. Pa. 1949).

246 Ruth v. Lewis, 166 F. Supp. 346 (D.D.C. 1958). The court could order proper administration despite contract provisions in the trust instrument giving the trustees absolute discretion to
determine eligibility to benefits.
It is interesting to note that this court treated the plaintiff as a beneficiary of a non-charitable
trust, not one possessed of a contractual right, and thus the court could not directly enforce the
trust. For a case decided in the same district in the same year, involving the same trust fund, where
the court treated the fund as a contract and thus ordered payment, see Hobbs v. Lewis, 159 F. Supp.
282 (D.D.C. 1958). That courts generally are divided as to the extent of judicial review available in
this situation is aptly illustrated in Annot., 42 A.L.R.2d 461 (1955).
247 Forrish v. Kennedy, 377 Pa. 370, 105 A.2d 67 (1954). The court appeared to apply the
doctrine of equitable estoppel. The trustees withheld the pension because the plaintiff, for three
years, had sold liquor in violation of the union constitution, but during that time his dues were
accepted, and no dispute arose when he sold the business and returned to work in the mines.
248 Geron v. Kennedy, 381 Pa. 97, 112 A.2d 181 (1955).

NOTES
Where the trustees of the fund reach a deadlock on an issue within their power,
another court has held it had jurisdiction to appoint an impartial umpire.2 49 Other
courts, when requested to intervene in the financial affairs of a union, apparently have
determined their actions by a close study of the peculiar facts before them. Thus, a
court might appoint a receiver until final determination of the issues; 250 enjoin certain
expenditures by unauthorized persons; 2 51 require the trustees to act in a specific manner
in order to avoid the chance or appearance of improper activity; 252 or order the officers
to make an accounting of the funds. 25 3 The trustee who abuses his office may be subject to criminal prosecution, 254 and may be held personally liable for any funds "illegally
or wrongfully received." 25 5 The union member taking legal action to prevent misapplication of funds is entitled to receive his counsel fees. 256
Inevitably connected with a union member seeking affirmative relief within the
judiciary is the requirement imposed upon the members of a voluntary association that
they first exhaust all internal remedies afforded by the union's constitution. This consideration was discussed above in relation to the problems of discipline 257 and the
exceptions to such a defense were synthesized. An additional exception to this general
rule exists in the area of union operating and welfare funds, since the union member
has a property interest in the money constituting the fund. Some courts will justify intervention where this property right of a member is jeopardized, 25 8 or where the court feels
the internal remedies which have not been exhausted would have been futile, illusory,
or in vain. 259 Fortunately, these courts have realized the distinction between a contro249 Barrett v. Miller, 166 F. Supp. 929 (S.D.N.Y. 1958); Petition of Feldman, 165 F. Supp. 190
(S.D.N.Y. 1958); Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 (Taft-Hartley Act) § 302(c)(5), 61
Stat. 157 (1947), 29 U.S.C., § 186(c)(5) (1952).
250 Robinson v. Nick, 235 Mo. App. 461, 136 S.W.2d 374 (1940).
251 Philadelphia Nat'l Bank v. Employing Bricklayer's Ass'n, 36 CCH Lab. Cas. 165177 (1959).
McCrave v. Severino, 249 App. Div. 112, 291 N.Y. Supp. 303 (1936); cf., In re Bricklayers' Local
No. 1, 159 F. Supp. 37, 42 (E.D. Pa. 1958), where, in an action to authorize the investment of a
union welfare fund, the court pointed out, that,
. . . [D]espite the fact that this proceeding is before the court on a petition
of the trustees to invest in real estate, rather than by a petition of union members
to restrain the expenditure, [the court) will determine the issues involved, since in
effect the Court will restrain the expenditure should it refuse permission to
make the investment.
252 American Bakeries Co. v. Barrick, 162 F. Supp. 882 (N.D. Ohio 1958). The trustees of a
union welfare fund were required to separate completely the office and files of the fund from the
union headquarters.
253 DeMonbrun v. Sheet Metal Workers Int'l Ass'n, 140 Cal. App. 2d 546, 295 P.2d 881 (1956).
Duke v. Franklin, 177 Ore. 297, 162 P.2d 141 (1945). The union officer has often been described
as a fiduciary in respect to funds collected from members of the union. See, e.g., Dusing v. Nuzzo,
177 Misc. 35, 29 N.Y.S.2d 883, modified, 263 App. Div. 59, 31 N.Y.S.2d 849 (1941).
254 People v. Cilento, 1 App. Div. 2d 200, 149 N.Y.S.2d 14, modified, 2 N.Y.2d 55, 138 N.E.2d
137(1956). People v. Williams, 145 Cal. App. 2d 163, 302 P.2d 393 (1956).
255 Duke v. Franklin, 177 Ore. 297, 162 P.2d 141 (1945).
256 O'Connor v. Harrington, 136 N.Y.S.2d 881 (Sup. Ct. 1954), modified, 285 App. Div. 900,
138 N.Y.S.2d 1 (1955).
257 See notes 150-51 supra and accompanying text.
258 Washington Local 104, Int'l Bhd. of Boilermakers v. International Bhd. of Boilermakers, 28
Wash. 2d 536, 183 P.2d 504, 509 (1947), aff'd on rehearing, 28 Wash. 2d 536, 189 P.2d 648 (1948):
"While the decisions are not entirely in harmony . . . the weight of authority appears to be . . .
to the general effect that where the controversy is financial in nature, rather than wholly disciplinary,
the courts make an exception to the general rule that it will not adjudicate the question presented."
Cf. Nissen v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 229 Iowa 1028, 295 N.W. 858, 866 (1941).
259 Dusing v. Nuzzo, 177 Misc. 35, 29 N.Y.S.2d 882, modified, 263 App. Div. 59, 31 N.Y.S.2d 849
(1941). This appears to be the leading case for such a rule. Union members were granted an accounting where evidence showed income from dues to be $200,000, the payments made to the
international to be $40,000, and the remaining bank balance at the end of this time was $107.93.
See also Booth v. Security Mft. Life Ins. Co., 155 F. Supp. 755, 762 (D.N.J. 1957), where the
court pointed out, after the objection was raised that the members had failed to exhaust their
internal remedies:
To this it need only be said that after two years of inaction by the Union
and its high officials in taking any steps against those primarily responsible plus
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versy disciplinary in nature and one concerned with the member's interest in union
funds. In Local 104, Int'l Bhd. of Boilermakers v. International Bhd. of Boilermakers
the court pointed out:
. . . The rule which requires members of voluntary associations to exhaust their
remedies within the order, before applying to the courts for relief, applies primarily
to controversies concerning matters of internal discipline, and not to disputes over
money or tangible property .... 260

In the recent case of De Monbrun v. Sheet Metal Workers Int'l Ass'n, the court observed
"Where mishandling of finances is involved, the requirement of exhausting internal
remedies is much less stringent." 261
Unfortunately, other jurisdictions, by applying the strict letter of the law pertaining to voluntary associations, will deny any recourse to the courts until all intraorganizational appeals have been exhausted. 262 This latter approach appears to be a
vexatious example of unyielding adherence by the courts to inflexible precedent. The
modern labor union, with its attendant responsibilities at our present stage of industrial
development, is far removed from what historically has been described as a "voluntary
association." The complex architecture of the modern union has so greatly separated it
from a voluntary association that one court was prompted to say:
The labor union is a developing institution and with its tremendous growth in importance and power has come to be more akin to the corporation than the partnership or the social or fraternal order . . . the ends of justice will be more properly
served if the courts apply to such organizations the rules applicable to corporations
rather than the rules applicable to voluntary fraternal orders .... 263

A New York court observed: "But a labor union is not a social club. It is an economic
of making a living under the expensive ininstrumentality conceived in the necessities
26 4
fluence of modern industrial concepts."
What appears to give the courts the most trouble in classifying a labor union as a
particular type of entity is the judicial necessity of resolving certain policy conflicts.
On the one hand is the right of a union to govern its own internal affairs, and on the
other, the necessity of protecting the interests of the individual members. More and
more it seems the courts are relying on principles of equity to resolve the disputes.
In the recent case of Mooney v. Bartenders' Union Local 284,265 the court
affirmed a writ of mandamus allowing a member to inspect certain financial records of
the unincorporated association. The court said:
Among the factors to be considered in determining whether interference by the courts
in the internal.affairs of a union is warranted on the basis of public policy is the nature
of the right asserted by the member. The inspection of the records is merely a preliminary step, and, if the manner, place and time are reasonable, the examination
cannot harm any proper union activity. Only after examination of the records can
it be determined whether or not conditions exist which require correction. To deny
a member access to the records and require him to exhaust all internal remedies in
the preliminary matter of inspection would unduly hamper the member's right and
possibly defeat the purpose of the investigation. On the other hand, it is to the best
interests of the union that any misuse of its funds be immediately revealed, and it
would serve no useful purpose to require that the examination of the books be delayed
member has followed the procedure required by the union in ordinary
until the
26 6
matters.
the alleged participation by high union officials in these frauds, combine to make
it apparent that any such intra-Union remedy is presently without avail. Doubtless
it is for that very reason that plaintiffs have filed the present suit.
See Jennings v. Jennings, 56 Ohio L. Abs. 258, 91 N.E.2d 899 (1949).
260 158 Wash. 480, 291 Pac. 328, 330 (1930).
261 140 Cal. App. 2d 546, 295 P.2d 881, 890 (1956).
262 Martin v. Favell, 344 Mich. 215, 73 N.W.2d 856 (1955); Way v. Patton, 195 Ore. 36, 241
P.2d 895 (1952)..
263 Oil Workers Union v. Superior Court, 103 Cal. App. 2d 512, 230 P.2d 71, 106 (1951).
264 Dusing v. Nuzzo, 177 Misc. 35, 29 N.Y.S.2d 882, 884, modified,'263 App. Div. 59, 31 N.Y.S.2d
849 (1941).
265 48 Cal. 2d 841, 313 P.2d 857 (1957).
266 Id. at 859. Of similar effect was a prior case, DeMonbrun v. Sheet Metal Workers Int'l Ass'n,
140 Cal. App. 2d 546, 295 P.2d 881 (1956), where union members were granted an accounting as to
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C. A Different Problem - Withdrawal of Local or Transfer of Members
Although the problems involving mismanagement and misappropriation of welfare
and pension funds, and their suggested solutions, are of primary concern to the unions
and their members, a distinct but significant arei of possible disagreement is emphasized
when a local union withdraws from the international, or a member is transferred from
one local to another. Here the question is not one of group safeguards but of individual
ownership, i.e., who is entitled to the money already paid into the welfare or pension
fund as between the withdrawing local or member and the remaining international or
local? Some courts have been satisfied to solve this query by using the time-worn
analogy of union-voluntary association, holding that where the contract between the
members of the association vests all assets in the central organization upon withdrawal
20 7
from or dissolution of the association, it will be given full protection by the courts.
Contained in almost all of the constitutions is a clause to the effect that all property
rights vest in or are forfeited to the parent or international in the event the charter2 of
68
any local is revoked, or in the event any local union dissolves, disbands or secedes.
Where the local union withdraws by a majority vote under such provision, the courts
generally will enforce the provision and permit the parent organization to recover the
forfeited property of the local. 26 9 However, this same result appears tenuous when the
disaffiliation is given the unanimous approval of the members of the local, 270 or where
there is a compelling reason for the local to desire disailiation. This latter position is
strikingly illustrated by the unusual situation existing in the International Bakers and
Confectionery Workers' Union. This union has a national pension plan covering
305,000 employees, 50,000 of whom seceded from the international after it was charged
with unethical practices by the AFL-CIO, and refused to dismiss its president, James
Cross, who had been charged with corrupt practices. A prime requisite for pension
eligibility in the union is membership in good standing in the international. The immediate issue presented is the effect of secession on the pension rights of these 50,000
members. If they stand to forfeit all their rights under the plan by secession, then they
might well be coerced into remaining in the international, thus perpetuating what had
been conceded to be a corrupt union. And, as one author points out, the situation could
well be reversed, and an ethical international could use the pension rights of the local
members as a club to enforce a house-cleaning of a corrupt local, which otherwise might
disaffiUate. 271 If and when this particular dispute is judicially resolved, much of the
vagaries in this area should disappear in favor of a uniform principle of law. Certainly,
some few jurisdictions have already begun moving in this direction. 27 2 In International
alleged dissipation of the funds by union officials, prior to exhausting their internal remedies. Cf.
Van Hook v. Southern California Waiters Alliance, 158 Cal. App. 2d 556, 323 P.2d 212 (1958),
which held that it is not imperative that a member take his appeal directly to the courts. In this
case, a former officer of a local sought to recover retirement benefits promised him. He attempted
first to obtain relief through union channels but without success. Upon subsequent recourse to
judicial relief, the union argued he was barred by the statute of limitations, citing DeMonbrun, supra,
and Mooney, supra, in support of their contention that it was not necessary for him to first exhaust
his internal remedies, but could have filed his action in the courts immediately upon retirement. The
court rejected the union's contention, noting it was the union itself which lulled the plaintiff into
a false sense of security, which restrained him from instituting proceedings before the running of
the statute.
267 United Public Workers v. Fennimore, 6 NJ. Super. 589, 70 A.2d 901 (Ch. 1950), where
the court analogized to a hypothetical "Home for the Aged." See also Harris v. Backman, 160 Ore.
520, 86 P.2d 456 (1939); Fidelity & Deposit Co. v. Brotherhood of Painters, Decorators and Paperhangers of America, 120 NJ. Eq. 346, 184 Ad. 832 (Ct. Err. & App. 1936).
268 See, e.g., Metal Polishers Int'l Union, Laws, Art. 21, § 17, pp. 45-46 (1956).
269 E.g., Brown v. Hook, 79 Cal. App. 2d 781, 180 P.2d 982 (1947); Low v. Harris, 90 F.2d 783
(7th Cir. 1937).
270 United Public Workers v. Fennimore, 6 NJ. Super. 589, 70 A.2d 901 (Ch. 1950); cf.,
Wolchok v. Durst, 66 N.Y.S.2d 295 (Sup. Ct 1946).
271 See Cohn, The Internationaland the Local Union, 11 N.Y.U. ANN.CONF. LAB.7 (1958).
272 For a general discussion of a local's withdrawal affecting property rights, see Annot., 23
A.L.R.2d 1209 (1952).
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Union of United Bakery Workers v. Becherer,27 3 a local voted almost unanimously to
withdraw from the parent union affiliated with the CIO, and accept a charter from the
AFL (at a time prior to merger). The court held that the local was entitled to retain
the funds in its treasury, stating:
The existence of the Local Union, its revenue and its functions, are not derived from
or dependent upon the International .... On the contrary, the international union
does depend for its continued existence upon affiliation with the local unions ....
Each local union is a separate and distinct voluntary association which owes its creation
and continued existence to the will of its own members. . . . [N]o direct property
right in the local union's assets can or does arise in favor of the international.274
This doctrine of the "independence" of the local as established in Becherer, has
been relied on and followed in Connecticut 27 5 and Ohio. 27 6 Adopting another consideration to alleviate the forfeiture provision, a New York court has held that where
the international union is first expelled from a federation, the contract between the local
and the international is abrogated and the local has a right, by the will of its members,
2 77
to withdraw affiliation and retain ownership and control of its funds and property.
Another factor which some courts have acknowledged is the type of funds involved.
Thus, where the278moneys are for purely local purposes they are not subject to the
forfeiture clause.
There also exists the problem of property rights where the single member or a
group must transfer to another local within the same parent union. In a recent New
York case certain members were required to transfer to another local when the international re-defined jurisdiction. Some trustees of their former local declined to transfer
the pension moneys collected for the transferred men, claiming it was beyond their
power as trustees to do so. A majority of the trustees, however, voted in favor of the
transfer. The court held the trust agreement could be amended to meet such contingencies so long as the fund "is not diverted from its primary purpose as a welfare and
pension plan."' 279 In a later case involving welfare, rather than pension, the court
held the new local entitled to the funds previously collected for the transferred
280
workers.
In summary, the judicial protection afforded a union member's financial interests
in his labor organization is potentially his greatest safeguard. It is tempered by the
reluctance of certain jurisdictions to discontinue applying the law of voluntary associations, with a concomitant "hands-off" policy, to labor unions. Such reluctance should
be discarded and a new branch of law - the law of labor organizations - developed
to cope with their current and increasingly serious problems. Although at their inception
labor unions were not unlike other voluntary associations, this similarity has disappeared
as the current economic and social structure of unionism has evolved. The controversies
of true voluntary associations (social fraternities, clubs, churches, etc.) are not the
same as those arising in labor organizations, and cannot reasonably be controlling if
just solutions are to be reached.
273 142 N.J. Eg. 561, 61 A.2d 16, aft'd, 4 N.J. Super. 456, 67 A.2d 900, cert. denied, 3 N.J. 374,
70 A.2d 537 (1949).
274 61 A.2d at 20.
275 Vilella v. McGrath, 136 Conn. 645, 74 A.2d 187 (1950).
276 Local 13013, UMW v. Cikra, 86 Ohio App. 41, 90 N.E.2d 154 (1949); Huntsman v. McGovern, 56 Ohio L. Abs. 170, 91 N.E.2d 717 (1949).
277

Clark v. Fitzgerald, 197 Misc. 235, 93 N.Y.S.2d 768 (Sup. Ct. 1949). The court considered the

affiliation with the CIO by the parent union as "of the essence of the contract," as the local would
not have joined but for the affiliation. Once the court had reached the point this continued
affiliation was an implied condition subsequent, and the expulsion of the parent union terminated
the contract. Accord, Duris v. Iozzi, 6 N.J. Super. 530, 70 A.2d 793 (1949).
278 See Donovan v. Danielson, 271 Mass. 267, 171 N.E. 823 (1930) (voluntary association
affiliated with Foresters of America).
279 Whelan v. O'Rourke, 5 App. Div. 2d 156, 170 N.Y.S. 2d 284, 287 (1958). It has been pointed
out that the issue of whether the property interest should be transferred with the members still remains as unsolved had the trustees of the former local specifically voted against the transfer of the
funds. Cohn, The Internationaland the Local Union, 11 N.Y.U. ANN. CONF. LAB. 7, 25 (1958).
280

Nicoletti v. Essenfield, 171 N.Y.S.2d 373 (Sup. Ct. 1958).

NOTES

The members of labor unions, both as individuals and as a group, have a far
greater right and a far greater need to have their funds protected by the courts, for
their very livelihood depends on this protection. There is nothing "voluntary" about a
member's association with his union when without this association he cannot work, and
eat, and live.
It is not naive to search for a uniform rule which will define clearly the rights of
international, locals, and members under the myriad factual situations that arise in this
area of pension and welfare funds. Divisions have been made between voluntary and
involuntary transfers, necessary and capricious secessions, but none have appeared to
resolve adequately the basic issue of who has the property right in the fund. Clearly, the
New York courts are developing an equitable doctrine which gives to the individual
employee a vested interest in the fund that cannot be denied him except under the most
extraordinary circumstances. 281 Until there is some such equitable solution to this issue,
decisions as diverse as the problems to which they are addressed will continue.
D. Legislative Safeguards
1) Federal
In order to preserve the integrity of employer-employee relations, the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947282 attempted to prohibit any act which could amount
283
to bribery or extortion or any form of dishonesty between employer and employees.
Thus the act makes it unlawful for the employer to make, or agree to make, any payment to any employee representative 284 and for that representative to accept or agree to
accept, any such "thing of value." 285 The act, however, provides a specific exception for
the employees' welfare and pension plans, provided these funds first meet certain conditions.2 8 To qualify under this exception the money paid to such trust fund must be
for the exclusive benefit of the employees, their families and dependents; the administration of the trust must be shared by employer and employee representatives; the trust
agreement must be in writing and make provision for an annual audit, and insure the
availability of the statements of such audit for inspection by interested persons. 28 7 Any
person who wilfully violates one of the provisions is subject to a fine not exceeding
10,000 dollars and/or imprisonment for not more than one year.28 8 Lastly, the act
extends28to
the federal district courts jurisdiction to restrain any violations of this
9
section.
Basically, the shortcomings of the statute are the lack of requirements necessitating
efficient management of the funds. 290 The trust agreement must be filed, but there is no
prohibition against exorbitant salaries and expenses. The results of the annual audit must
be "available for inspection," yet there is no specification as to what information must
be included in this report and conceivably a minimal disclosure would suffice. 291 It has
even been suggested that section 302(c) (5) of the act does not of itself make any act
or omission a criminal offense, which accounts for the lack of criminal prosecutions in
this area. 292 One federal district court went so far as to refuse jurisdiction of an action
281

See notes 279 and 280, supra.
61 Stat. 136 (1947), as amended, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-88 (1952).
See United States v. Brennan, 134 F. Supp. 42 (D.C. Minn.), aff'd, 240 F.2d 253 (8th Cir.
1955), cert. denied, 353 U.S.931 (1957).
284 61 Stat. 157 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 186(a) (1952).
285 61 Stat. 157 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 186(b) (1952).
286 61 Stat. 157 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 186(c)(5) (1952).
282
283

287

Ibid.

288 61 Stat. 157 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 186(d) (1952).
289 61 Stat. 157 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 186(e) (1952).
290 See American Bakeries Co. v.Barrick, 162 F. Supp. 882 (N.D.Ohio 1958), where the court
recognized and lightly criticized the Taft-Hartley Act for failing to specify standards or rules of
management for such trust funds on which a court could intelligently, decide the legality of a
particular trust arrangement.
291 1956 Final Rep. 57-59.
292 1956 Final Rep. 58.
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based on a violation of section 186(c) (5), despite section 186(e), stating:
[S]ince no violations of § 186 (a) or (b) are involved, there is no basis for invoking
the powers of the United States courts .... [T]o read into this statute, as plaintiffs
urge, a broad bestowal of jurisdiction over all disputes relating to union293welfare funds
is not consonant with the architecture of the law or with its purpose.
However much these provisions of the Taft-Hartley Act promote the fair and
efficient administration of welfare and pension funds in principle, a close scrutiny
reveals various inadequacies that have greatly diluted any effective sanctions against
misappropriation or mismanagement.
In an apparent attempt to rectify the weaknesses of the Taft-Harley Act, and offer
an increased form of protection to the beneficiaries of welfare and pension funds, the
Welfare and Pension Plans Disclosure Act of 1958294 was passed. It is the avowed
purpose of this act to protect, through disclosure and reporting, the rights of participants
and beneficiaries in such plans. 295 Basically, it requires the administrator or person in
charge of the plan to publish a complete description of the plan's operation and have
detailed annual reports certified by an independent certified or licensed public accountant. 296 Such publication shall be made available for examination by any participant or beneficiary "in the principal office of the plan," and shall be filed with the
Secretary of Labor.29 7 To provide for the enforcement of the act, a wilful violation is
made a misdemeanor subject to a fine of not more than 1,000 dollars or imprisonment
for not more than six months; failure to supply beneficiaries with reports may render
the administrator liable to such beneficiary up to fifty dollars for each day from the
date the report was due.29 8 Under existing law a false statement sworn to by the administrators of the plan and filed with the Secretary of Labor subjects them to a fine up
to 10,000 dollars and/or up to five years imprisonment.2 99
It is perhaps too early to determine the effectiveness of this legislation. CriticiSm
of it has been frequent, principally on the basis that the act is too mild a measure.3 00
Certain weaknesses appear to be inherent in the act and form the foundation for such
disapprobation. President Eisenhower strongly objected to it (even though signing it
into law) because court proceedings to enforce the provisions must be instigated by
participants or their beneficiaries, most of whom do not possess the needed resources
of legal experience to cope with the most flagrant abuses. 30 ' Another infirmity was
pointed out by the Secretary of Labor when he expressed the view that the Department
of Labor's function under this act was a purely custodial capacity and that it had no
authority to investigate the accuracy of any information or statistics contained in the
reports on fie.302 The AFL-CIO considered the act a "watered down measure."3 03
293 Moses v. Ammond, 162 F. Supp. 866 (S.D.N.Y. 1958). But see American Bakeries Co. v.
Barrick, 162 F. Supp. 882 (N.D. Ohio 1958), where the court heard and decided a question involving the administration of a union trust fund, and was clearly prepared to grant an injunction if
necessary. Cf. In re Bricklayers' Local No. 1, 159 F. Supp. 37 (E.D: Pa. 1958).
294 72 Stat. 997 (1958), 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 301-09 (Supp. 1958).
295 72 Stat. 997 (1958), 29 U.S.C.A. § 301 (Supp. 1958). The Act does not apply to a plan
covering less than twenty-five employees. 72 Stat. 999 (1958), 29 U.S.C.A. § 303(b) (4) (Supp. 1958).
296 This certification shall be "based on a comprehensive audit conducted in accordance with
accepted standards of auditing," but this is not required to be performed on "the books or records
of any bank, insurance company, or other institution providing an insurance, investment or related
function for the plan, if such books or records are subject to examination by any agency of the
Federal Government, or of the government of any State." 72 Stat. 1000 (1958), 29 U.S.C.A. § 306
(b) (Supp. 1958).
297 72 Stat. 1002, 29 U.S.C.A. § 307 (Supp. 1958).
298 72 Stat 1002, 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 308 (a), (b) (Supp. 1958).
299 62 Stat. 749, 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1950). "Whoever, in any matter within the jurisdiction of any
department or agency of the United States, knowingly and willingly falsifies . . .a material fact, or
makes any false, fictitious or fraudulent statements . . .shall be fined not more than $10,000 or
imprisoned not more than five years, or both."
300 Levitan, Welfare and Pension Plans Disclosure Act, 9 1-n. L.S. 827, 833-34 (1958).
301 N.Y. Times, August 30, 1958, p. 16, col. 4.
302 Scaife, The Welfare and Pension Plans Disclosure Act, 14 Bus. Lkw 162, 163 (1958).
303 Levitan, supra note 300, at 834.
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But if nothing else was accomplished by the passage of this act, it showed that
congressional leaders fully realized their responsibility of adopting legislation on the

federal level which will adequately protect the beneficiaries of such funds.30 4 The acceptance of this obligation is a major advance in the ultimate arrival at a satisfactory
solution to a problem that has greatly troubled all concerned.
2) State
A total of ten states 305 and the territory of Hawaii 3086 have enacted legislation
dealing generally with the financial structure and responsibilities of labor unions operating within state jurisdictions. These acts generally require the union to furnish the
state with financial statements or reports, 30 7 or to make available to members the
organization's books, records and accounts.30 8 Six states 3o9 have enacted legislation
specifically aimed at the management of welfare and pension funds, and chiefly patterned after the Federal Welfare and Pension Plans Disclosure Act.
The states base their authority to make such regulations on the assertion that
welfare plans "vitally affect the well-being of millions of people and are in the public
interest,"31 0 while regulations of the unions are an exercise of the state's "police power
in the protection of public interest."3' 1 The constitutionality of these statutes has been
upheld on the ground that they are police measures, and thus not violative of freedom
3 13
of speech or assembly, 312 or freedom against unlawful search and seizure.
There are certain provisions omitted from the state statutes dealing with welfare
and pension plans which mitigate their effectiveness and scope. New York, for example,
by definition excludes unilateral employer-administered funds; 31 4 Massachusetts does
not require the financial reports to be certified by a certified or licensed public account304 See remarks of Congressman Teller (sponsor of the Disclosure Act), 15 CoNo. REc. 15052
(1958) and Senator Kennedy's remarks in 16 CONG. REC. 16511-12 (1958). Both indicated the
real need for further congressional action in this vital area.
305 ALA. CODE tit. 26, § 382 (Supp. 1955); Conn. P.A. 628 L. 1957, reprinted in 4 CCH Lab. L.
Rep. 42010, at 41704 (July 11, 1957); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 447.07 (1952); KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§ 44-806 (1949); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 180, § 18 (1955); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 179.21 (1947);
ORE. REV. STAT. § 661.040 (1957); S.D. CODE § 17.1105 (Supp. 1952); TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN.
art. 5154a (1957); Wis. STAT. § 111.08 (1955).
306

HAwArt Rv. LAW § 90-11 (1955).

307 See, e.g., ALA. CODE tit. 26, -§ 382(6) (Supp. 1955), wherein it is provided that the labor
organization must file with the Department of Labor a "complete financial statement of all fees,
dues, fines or assessments levied and/or received, together with an itemized list of all disbursements
with names of recipients and purpose therefor ..
"
308 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 447.07 (1952). While not requiring a financial statement to be submitted
to the state or the members, it is mandatory that accurate books of account be kept, and members
may inspect these books at reasonable times. It seems the union member has the right to consult an
attorney or an accountant regarding any statement of the union's affairs he receives. Wilkins v.
De Koning, 152 F. Supp. 306 (E.D.N.Y. 1957).
309 CAL. INS. CODE §§ 10640-55 (Supp. 1958); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 151D, §§ 1-10 (Supp. 1958);
N.Y. BANyjNo LAW §§ 60-75 Supp. 1958); N.Y. INS. LAW § 37(a)-(p) (Supp. 1958); WASH. RaV.
CODE §§ 48.52.010-.080 1955); Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 211.01-.17 (Supp. 1959); Conn. P.A. 594 L.
1957 (reprinted in 4 CCII Lab. L. Rep. 42301-12 at 41705-2 to 41705-6 (July 11, 1957) ).
310 E.g., N.Y. INS. LAW § 37 (Supp. 1958).
311 ALA. CODE tit. 26, § 376 (Supp. 1955).
312 Alabama State Federation of Labor v. McAdory, 325 U.S. 450 (1945); Bowe v. Secretary of
Commonwealth, 320 Mass. 230, 69 N.E.2d 115, 131 (1946); Borden v. Sparks, 54 F. Supp. 300 (N.D.
Ala. 1944).
313 AFL v. Mann, 188 S.W.2d 276 (Tex Civ. App. 1945).
314 N.Y. INS. LAW § 37(a) (Supp. 1958); see Note, 58 COLUM. L. REv. 78, 104 (1958) for a
criticism of such omission. In March, 1959, Governor Rockefeller introduced a bill in the New York
Legislature whose principal aim is to curb abuses within the financial structure of the unions. The
bill is likely to receive prompt approval because it makes no attempt to legislate in the area of
internal democracy, but is directed at the fiduciary and financial obligations of union officers and
agents. The bill has received highly favorable editorial comment. N.Y. Times, March 14, 1959, p. 1,
col. 1; Id. p. 14, col. 2-3. See also N.Y. Times, March 16, 1959, p. 30, col 1.
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ant;3 15 Washington fails to impose many of the prohibitions prudently enumerated by
other states.3 16 Nevertheless, until adequate federal legislation is enacted, and in light
of the general theory upon which these acts are based, i.e., that disclosure of information should deter the perpetration of further abuses and aid in uncovering present
wrongdoing, these laws are necessary to provide adequate supervision in an area vitally
affecting the public interest.
E. ProposedFederalLegislation
Presently pending before Congress are two labor-management reporting and disclosure bills. They are commonly known by the names of their sponsors, the KennedyErvin bill 3 17 and the Goldwater bill. 3 1 8 Both of these are, basically, attempts to provide
additional necessary safeguards against improper practices in labor organizations and
labor-management relations. Regarding the provisions affecting a member's interest in
union funds they are fundamentally similar, any divergence being the result of the
different emphasis placed on the role of labor and management in administering the
funds.
Certain requirements as to the contents of financial statements are enumerated, no
longer allowing summary reports to suffice. 319 The interchange of finance between
management and unions is carefully scrutinized, and in some cases prohibited.3 2 0 Every
union officer must report any stock or interest held by him or his family in "an employer
whose employees such labor organization represents or is seeking to represent," 32
' or
in a business, a substantial part of which consists of dealing with that employer.322 This
provision, however, does not apply to securities traded on a national securities
323
exchange.
The Goldwater bill provides for judicial intervention upon any abuse of responsibility of a person entrusted with funds and property of a labor organization. This action
may be maintained by one or more members of the organization, and nothing is said
regarding exhaustion of internal remedies. 324 The Kennedy bill expressly requires that
the aggrieved member first request the union's governing board to act, and upon its failure the member can gain access to the federal courts.3 25 This bill specifically makes embezzlement or conversion of welfare or pension funds a federal offense. 326
Perhaps the most important improvement of these bills on existing legislation is to
vest authority in the Secretary of Labor to inspect records and accounts in order to
investigate any fact or condition, including the accuracy and completeness of any re315 MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 151D, §§ 1-10 (Supp. 1958).
316 WASH. REv. CODE §§ 48.52.010-.080 (1955). An example of such a prohibition included in
another state is found in MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 151D, § 3(c) (Supp. 1958). "No trustee or employer
or labor organization . . .shall receive directly or indirectly any payment, commission, loan, service
or any other thing of value from any insurance company, insurance agent, insurance broker or any
hospital, surgical or medical plan, in connection with . . . a contract providing benefits for such
trust..
" Another is in N.Y. BANKING LAW § 71(3) (Supp. 1958); N.Y. INS. LAW § 37-e(3)
(Supp. 1958) (All disbursements must be paid by check).
317 S. 505, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959).
318 S. 748, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959).
319 S. 505, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. § 101 (1959); S. 748, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 202-03 (1959).
Under both bills, the Secretary of Labor is authorized to specify by regulations the amount of detail
and the form and manner of the report. S. 505, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. § 101(c) (1959); S. 748, 86th
Cong., 1st Sess. § 203(a) (1959).
320 S. 505, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. § 107(b) (1959) (loans by management to officers or members
of a union representing or seeking to represent that employer are prohibited). S. 748, 86th Cong.,
1st Sess. § 205(a) (1959) requires that they must be carefully reported.
321 S. 505, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. § 102(a) (1959). The Goldwater Bill has a similar provision. S.
748, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. § 205(a) (1959).
322 S.505, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. § 102(a)(3) (1959).
323 S.505, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. § 102(a)(6) (1959).
324 S.748, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. § 301(b) (1959).
325 S.505, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. § 109(b) (1959).
326 S.505, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. § 109(a) (1959).
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Secretary may bring an
quired report.3 27 The Goldwater bill further provides that 3the
28
action to enjoin an actual or potential violation of the act.
Much of the criticism directed at the Taft-Hartley and Welfare and Pension Plan
Disclosure Acts3 2 9 has apparently been heeded by the authors of these two pending
bills. At least a legitimate effort was made in this direction. Since there appears to be
mounting sentiment33 0 that the problem must finally be met by federal legislation, it
seems highly likely that one of these proposals, in at least a modified form, will subsequently become enacted into law. Only at that time can it be examined to conclusively
determine its improvements and failings, so that additional legislation, if necessary,
can be initiated.
F. Conclusion
It is clear that the management and control of union funds, the welfare, pension,
and general, have ramifications extending to an immense latitude, and render a substantial impact on workers and their beneficiaries. Equally clear is the proposition that
the interests possessed by such individuals should be protected. The divergence of
opinion occurs in determining the means to achieve such protection. In conflict over
the proposed solutions is the right of the union to self-government as opposed to
federal or state intervention and regulation.
Existing law has apparently predicated its safeguards on the premise that publicity
is the keenest inducement to probity and a stimulus to integrity. It was felt that
quantitative financial reports would force disclosure of abuses, and union members
would compel prosecution of the defalcating officials. This conception proved deficient
primarily due to the requirement that the impetus needed to instigate any proceeding
must be from an interested party. It was pointed out in the subcommittee's report that:
As a practical matter, an employee-beneficiary will probably think twice before
agreeing to undergo the cost and risk of a suit which constitutes a challenge both
to the power and authority of a board of trustees (which can grant or withhold
benefits) and, in most cases, to the power and authority of his own union's
leadership.331

Perhaps the severest limitation to such requirement is that it proceeds on the
assumption that the members who are trained primarily in their particular field can
critically analyze financial statements to discover possible dissipation of the funds when
such a task is exceedingly difficult even for a trained accountant. That adequate
federal and state legislation shall someday afford maximum safeguards to these funds
crucially affecting our economy is certain that such increased protection be imminent is
earnestly desired.
V.

UNION GOVERNMENT

To Gompers and the other great leaders of Our early labor movement, unions
could be nothing but democratic. One of the first goals of the unions was to free the
workers from the tyranny of the "profit-mongers" and to give them a voice as to
the conditions under which they would work. 33 2 .Unfortunately today, in some instances, the tyranny of the "profit-mongers" has been replaced by the tyranny of
union "bosses." While the instances of abuse in this area are undoubtedly few,3 33 nonetheless, because some union members are being denied the right to speak, to vote, and
to run for office, this area of our national life deserves serious study and attention.
This section of survey will examine the extent of the individual member's right to
participate in the governmental processes of his union. An attempt will be made to
327 S. 505, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. § 106(c) (1959); S. 748, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. § 404(a) (1959).
328 S. 748, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. § 405 (1959).
329 See Levitan, supra note 300, at 833-34. See text at pp. 000 supra.
330 See note 304, supra; N.Y. Times, March 14, 1959, p. 1, col. 1.
331 1956 FinalRep. 66.
332
333

GOMPERS, LABOR AND COMMON WELFARE 5-6 (1919).
TAFT, STRUCTURE AND GOVERNMENT OF LABOR UNIONs, 245-46 (1954).
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view the member's rights under three aspects: (A) his rights under the various union
constitutions, (B) his rights as recognized by the courts of law, and (C) his rights
under existing or proposed legislation.
A. Union Constitutional Provisions
The ideal of democratic unionism is stressed in the preamble of the Constitution
of the AFL-CIO.
The establishment of this Federation . . .is an expression of the hopes and aspirations of the working people of America.
We seek the fulfillment of these hopes and aspirations through democratic
processes within the framework of our constitutional government and consistent with
our institutions and traditions.334
Again, later in this constitution it is stated that one of the objects of the Federation
will be to "safeguard the democratic character of the labor movement. ' 33 5
The Committee on Ethical Practices established by the AFL-CIO Constitution 36
was accordingly directed by the AFL-CIO Executive Council to develop a set of ethicalpractice codes to serve as a guide for the union movement.33 7 The sixth of the resulting series of codes deals with democratic processes 33 8 and enunciates in detail the
right of the individual union member to participate freely in the government of his
union. According to its terms, union members have the right to vote in honest elections
for their local and national officers. They are entitled to run for office and hold office
subject to uniform, non-discriminatory qualifications, and they are entitled to voice
their opinions as to the conduct of union affairs. Union elections and national conventions are to be held regularly, at least every four years. This code concludes by
urging those unions which do not meet the standards set forth to amend their constitutions to comply with these requirements.3 3 9
Since the AFL-CIO has no effective way to enforce these standards, 3 4 0 it is necessary
to turn to the constitutions of the various national unions in order to understand the
nature of the election procedures of each union. The vast majority of union constitutions place no substantial restrictions on the members' right to vote. In seventy-five
constitutions surveyed, it was found that forty-two did not even have any explicit provisions concerning qualifications to vote in union elections. In some of these unions, it
would seem that the right to vote arises as a provision of membership in good standing
under the terms of a general protective clause such as that found in the Bricklayers'
constitution:
Every member of the International Union shall stand equal before the law in his
rights and privileges, and shall be entitled to all benefits and protection, providing
he conform to the rules and form of procedure herein mentioned.341
In those constitutions which do not contain such a blanket provision, the right to
vote can be inferred from other clauses. For instance, many union constitutions contain
an equality clause from which it may be inferred that no member's right to vote may
be denied him on the basis of race, creed, national origin, or sex.3 42 Again, some
334 AFL-CIO, CONST. 1 (1957).

335 Id. at art. II, § 11, p. 4.
336 Id. at art. XIII, § I(d), p. 32.
337 AFL-CIO, Publication No. 50, CODns OF ETHICAL PRACTICES 15-16 (1958).
338 This Code was approved by the Executive Council on May 23, 1957 and, along with the five
earlier codes, was adopted by the AFL-CIO convention in December, 1957.
339 AFL-CIO, Publication No. 50, supra n. 337, at 46-48. The provisions of this code substantially
comply with the standards suggested in American Civil Liberties Union, Labor Union "Bill of
Rights," Feb. 13, 1958.
340 This does not mean that the AFL-CIO has not persuaded many unions to adopt the Ethical
Practices Codes (see note 365 infra.). Rather, it indicates that there is no constitutional authority for
the Federation to intervene in the internal affairs of its affiliate unions.
341 Bricklayers Int'l Union, CoNsT., art. XII, § 2, pp. 51-52 (1956). For similar provisions lee
Brotherhood of Maintenance of Way Employees, CONST., art. XXI, § 1, p. 65 (1955).
342 "Regardless of creed, color, nationality or sex, every worker employed in cement, lime, gypsum
and allied industry plants must become an integral part of the International Union." United Cement
Workers, CONsT., art. 2, § 2, p. 4 (1957); International Union of United Brewery Workers, CONST.,
Declarationof Principles (h), p. 2 (1956).
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provide that officers shall be elected by a majority, or plurality, vote of the members
of the union.3 4 3 Finally, many union constitutions contain a preamble or declaration of
principles 3 which commit the organization to the principles of free and democratic

unionism. 44
Sixteen of the remaining thirty-three constitutions contain provisions which explicitly guarantee the right to vote in elections to members in good standing.3 45 Several
of these unions, while guaranteeing the right to vote, require that a person must have
been a member in good standing for a specified period of time in order to vote. Thus,
the United Mine Workers constitution requires that a member shall have been in good
standing for the three months prior to December 1st of each election year. 34 6 The
Glass Bottle Blowers Association guarantees the right of members in good standing to
that a member must have attended at least two
vote, 347 but adds the requirements
3 48

regular meetings per year.

Eight unions provide the same basic requirements as the fifteen unions just mentioned but frame their requirements as restrictions on the right to vote, rather than as
guarantees of the right. For example, the American Newspaper Guild provides that:
"No member not in good standing shall be permitted to vote ... 349 The constitution
of the International Typographical Union, besides restricting the right to vote to members in good standing, provides that a member's card shall have been in the hands of
the local secretary for at least thirty days prior to the election. At the option of the
subordinate (local) union, the membership requiremeht may be increased in length
up to ninety days. 350
The constitutions of six unions have provisions which impose substantial restrictions on the right to vote. Three of these unions are theatrical unions restricting the
right to vote to certain classes of members, such as the American Guild of Musical
Artists, which divides its membership into eight classes, and allows only the members
of four "active" classes to vote. 351 The Amalgamated Meat Cutters and Butchers do
not permit members who are not actively working in the industry to vote except in
matters of granting sick or death benefits.352 In the Brotherhood of Electrical Workers,
the local unions are granted the power Jo determine whether apprentices, helpers and
groundmen may or may not be entitled to voice opinions and to vote at local
meetings.3 53 Of these unions the one which undoubtedly places the greatest restrictions
on its members' right to vote is the Operating Engineers Union. By the terms of its constitution there is established a system of locals and subordinate locals.3 5 4 Members of
subordinate locals are under the authority of the parent local in their area. They may
343 E.g., Transport Workers, CONST., art. XVI, §§ 1-2, p. 39 (1957).
344 E.g., National Union United Welders, CONST., Preamble, p. 3 (1948); United Rubber
Workers, CoNsr., Preamble,p. 2 (1956).
345 E.g., UAW, CONST., art. 38, § 11(a), p. 97 (1957). "Every member in good standing shall
be entitled to vote at all Local Union elections."; Seafarers Int'l Union, CoNST., art. III, § HII, 3(a)
p. 4 (1957); United Steelworkers, CoHsT., art. V, § 3, p. 19 (1956).
346 UMW, CONsT., art. XI, § 3, p. 28 (1956). Elections for International officers take place on
the second Tuesday of December every fourth year. Id. at art. XI, § 2, p. 28.
347 Glass Bottle Blowers Ass'n, CONST. art. II, § 4, p. 9 (1957).
348 Id. art. IX, § 1, p. 24.
349 American Newspaper Guild, CoNsT., art. X, § 4, p. 28 (1957). See also, Oil Workers Int'l
Union, CONSr., art. III, § 9, p. 58 (1956).
350 International Typographical Union, BYLAWS, art. IX, § 11, p. 44 (1958). This constitution
also contains a provision explicitly guaranteeing the right to vote to all members residing at the
Union Printers Home. Id. art. IX, § 12, p. 44.
351 American Guild of Musical Artists, CONST., art. III, § 3, p. 7 (1954). The other two unions
which restrict the right to vote to certain classes of members are Actors Equity and the Screen
Actors Guild. See Actors Equity Ass'n, CONsT., art. III §§ 2 & 5, p. 8 (1955); Screen Actors Guild,
BY-LAws, art. IV, § 5, p. 4 (1957).
352 Amalgamated Meat Cutters, Lo..cAL CONsT., art. I, § 3, p. L-5 (1956).
353 International Bhd. of Elec. Workers, CONST., art. XVII, § 16, p. 46 (1958).
354 International Union of Operating Engineers, CONsT., art. XIV. § 4, p. 38 (1956).
355 Id., art. XIV, § 5, p. 39.
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no
vote on matters of local concern only by permission of the parent local, and in 355
instance may members of a subordinate local vote for officers of the parent local.
There are an additional four unions which have special provisions relating to voting.
The Photo Engravers Union requires that a member must have belonged to a local for
six months in order to vote on a collective bargaining agreement. 3 56 In locals of the
Masters, Mates and Pilots, which have both in-shore and off-shore members, the local
may incorporate a provision into its by-laws that forbids off-shore members to vote
on in-shore matters and vice-versa. 357 The constitution of the Street, Electric Railway
and Motorcoach employees has two provisions relating to strike votes and referendums.
The right of every member to vote on the acceptance of certain collective bargaining
propositions is guaranteed, 358 and where a referendum question is being voted upon
at a local meeting, no member may abstain from voting. 359 Finally, the Hosiery Workers
360
specifically guarantee the right of apprentices and helpers to vote on all questions.
1) Right of Free Speech
Obviously, for the right to vote to be at all meaningful the individual union members must have the right to express their views on union policies and on the qualifications of their officers. While the AFL-CIO Ethical Practice Code on Union Democratic
Processes states that the member should have the right "to voice his views as to the
method in which the union's affairs should be conducted, ' 361 this right "to criticize
not include the right to underthe policies and personalities of his union officers does
362
mine the union ... or to carry on slander and libel."
None of the constitutions surveyed contains a section specifically guaranteeing the
rights of speech, press and petition. 363 It would seem, however, that theoretical safeguards for these rights exist within a large number of union constitutions, since those
unions which have adopted the AFL-CIO Ethical Practice Codes would seem to have
36 4
Also, a blanket provision
committed themselves to a recognition of these rights.
a basis for inferring a
might
form
recognizing the principles of democratic unionism
365
constitutional protection of free expression.
While none of the constitutions explicitly guarantees the right of free expression,
several unions recognize this right in relation to specific activities within the union.
Consequently, several unions have provisions according candidates for office the
opportunity to have their views presented to the rank and file member. Perhaps the
outstanding example of a union which encourages active campaigning and opposition
366
This union
in contests for union office is the International Typographical Union.
355 Id., art. XIV, § 5, p. 39.
356 International Photo Engravers Union, CoNsr., art. XX, § 3, p. 43 (1958).
357 International Organization of Masters, CONST., art. III, § 13(b), p. 8 (1954).
358 Amalgamated Ass'n of Street, Electric Ry. and Motor Coach Employees, CoNST., § 123, p. 44
(1957).
359 Id., § 135, p. 47.
360 American Federation of Hosiery Workers, CONST., art. XIV, § 3, p. 46 (1957).
361 AFL-CIO, CODES OF ETHICAL PACTICES, Code VI, p. 46 (1958).
362 Id. at 46-47.
363 However it should be noted that recognition of the members' right to criticize their officers
or the policies of the union is given in several union constitutions; e.g. National Maritime Union,
CONsT., art. 7, § 14(c), p. 29. (1957); Oil and Chemical Workers, CoNsr., art. XVI, § 30 (10),
p. 27 (1957).
364 IUE-AFL-CIO CONST., art XXII, § D, p. 45 (1957). See also American Newspaper Guild,
MANUAL, art. VI, § 3(e), p. 14 (1957).
365 Besides the unions mentioned in note 363 supra, the following unions have adopted the

AFL-CIO Ethical Practices Code: (1) UAW CONsT., art. 31, § 3, p. 76 (1957); Operative Potters
CONST., § 166, p. 23 (1957); Distillery, Rectifying and Wine Workers Int'l Union, 81 MONTHLY LAB.
R v. 653 (1958); Laundry and Dry Cleaning Int'l Union, 81 MONTHLY LAB. REv. 783 (1958);
International Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 81 MONTHLY LAB. REv. 1409 (1958); Operating Eng'rs, 82
MONTHLY LAB. REv. 16 (1958). This list is by no means exhaustive of those unions which have
adopted these codes. However, it would seem that the combined pressures of public opinion, dissatisfaction of the rank and file and the prodding of the AFL-CIO Executive Council are forcing even
the most reluctant unions to adopt these codes.
366
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NOTES
throughout most of its history maintained a genuine two party system, featuring extremely vigorous campaigns, with no party holding control for more than twenty
years. 3 67 As a result of this type of campaign, rank and file participation in the
elective process is very high. Since 1938, in every election for national office, over
seventy percent of the membership has voted.3 68 The democratic character of this
union is reflected in its constitution. Candidates for office are entitled to space in the
two issues of the union newspaper immediately preceding the election for the presentation of arguments in behalf of their candidacy. 369 The right of the parties to publish
and distribute campaign literature and partisan newspapers is recognized.3 70 As Professor Taft has pointed out this union has, over a period of years, set an excellent example of democratic unionism. 37 1 The fact that other unions have not developed the
same traditions as the ITU is undoubtedly a result of historical circumstances, for
many unions do indeed theoretically protect the members' right to express their opinions

freely.
Many unions provide for equal space to candidates in their various newspapers
and journals.37 2 In addition a number of union constitutions allow the members to
institute referendums 373 and to recall officers through petitions.37 4 And in some unions,
members may submit petitions to the convention with a view toward amending the
constitution or committing the union to policies which the petitioners favor. 375 Or
finally, in some unions it is possible to call a special convention 3of76 the union to consider
matters which the petitioners deem important to their welfare.
A potential danger to the members' right to express themselves exists in provisions
punishing certain types of speech by a member. Of the seventy-five constitutions studied,
sixty-six of them had provisions of this type. While the wording of these provisions vary
somewhat, the offenses which are recognized are in the nature of slanderous remarks
against fellow members or officers,3 77 untrue statements relative to union matters, 37 8
statements which are detrimental to the best interest of the union,379 and abusive
language. 380 Clearly the union should have the right to punish a member who clearly
has slandered or maliciously abused a fellow member. Just as the state has the right
to punish sedition, so too should the union be entitled to punish a member who attempts
to undermine the union. As has been pointed out, the danger in these vague tests of
TAFT, STRucTuRE AND GOVERNMENT or LABOR UNIONS 52 (1954).
368 Id. at 57-59.
369 Id. at 58.
370 ITU BOOK OF LAws, art. IX, § 5, p. 40 (1958).
371 TAFT, op. cit. supra note 367, at 41.
372 See for example, IUJE-AFL-CIO, CONST., art. XXII, § D, p. 45 (1957); American Newspaper
Guild, MANUAL, art. VI, § 3(e), p. 14 (1957); Operative Potters, CONST., § 59, p. 8 (1957).
373 E.g., International Ass'n of Fire Fighters, CoNsT., art. XIX, § 1, p. 22 (1956); American
Fed'n of Gov't Employees, CONST., art. XX, § 1, p. 33 (1956).
374 E.g., Operating Eng'rs, CONsT., art. XVIII, § 3, p. 70 (1956); International Ass'n of Machinists, CONST., art. III, § 21, p. 12 (1958); IUE-AFL-CIO, art. X, § A, p. 17 (1957).
375 E.g., United Brewery Workers, CONST., art. X, § 13(b), p. 47 (1956); UMW, CONsT., art.
XII, § 17, p. 45 (1956).
376 E.g., UAW, CONsT., art 8, § 4, p. 13 (1957); Retail, Wholesale and Department Store Union,
CONST., art. III, § 18, p. 11 (1954); Brotherhood of Ry. and S.S. Clerks, CoNsT., art. 7, § 2(a), p. 15
(1955).
377 E.g., United Steelworkers, CONST., art. XII, § 1(g), p. 51 (1956); International Chemical
Workers, CoNsr., art. XII,.§ 1(5), p. 15 (1957); Teamsters Union, CONsT., art. XVIII, § 6(8), p.
73 (1957); International Ass'n Machinists, CoNsr., art. K, § 1, p. 77 (1958).
378 E.g., International Bhd. of Elec. Workers, CoNsT., art. XXVII, § 2(6), p. 71 (1958); UMW,
CoNsT., art. XXI, § 3, p. 78 (1956); United Steel Workers, CONST., art. XII, § l(e), p. 51 (1956).
379 E.g., American Fed'n of Hosiery Workers, CONsr., art. XVI, § l(b), pp. 49-50 (1957); Communications Workers of America, CONST., art XIX, § 1(k), p. 40 (1957).
380 E.g., Pulp Mill Workers, CoNsT., § 7, p. 38 (1956); United Brewery Workers, CoNsT., art.
XIII, § 3(8), p. 56 (1956).
381 Aaron, Protecting Civil Liberties of Members Within Trade Unions, 3 PRocEEDINos INDUSTRIAL RMLATIONS RESEARcH Ass'N 38 (1950). For a discussion of the procedure and administration of intra-union discipline, see pp. 398-99 supra.
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guilt is essentially a procedural problem. 38 ' If these provisions are impartially and
properly administered the members' right to speak will be adequately protected.
A recent example illustrates this point. At the 1956 Steelworkers' convention,
monthly dues were raised from three to five dollars. Led by Donald C. Rarick and
Nicholas Mamula, a dues-protest committee was formed to fight these increases. In the
1957 election, Rarick polled 233,516 votes in losing to the incumbent president, David
McDonald. The dues-protest committee continued in existence and continued to fight
the policies of President McDonald. The attack broadened to include protests against
the appointive powers of the president, and against those provisions in the constitution
dealing with slander. The dissenters felt that the staff members appointed by the
president were not answerable to the membership. They maintained that the provisions
in the constitution- dealing with slander could be used to punish "honest members
who want to present their dissenting opinions."382 This disagreement came to a head
at the Ninth Steelworkers Convention held last September. The dissenters attempted
to secure convention action in favor of curbing the president's appointive power.
They also urged the convention to remove the sections from the constitution dealing
with slander, and to lower the dues. All three proposals were overwhelmingly defeated.
The convention then took action against the dues-protest members in the form of a
resolution which accused the dissenters of being "traitors to trade union principles." 383
This resolution charged the dues-protest members of dual unionism, slander, and
meeting in secret conclave to undermine the union. The resolution ended by calling on
all locals to take immediate action and expel those who were guilty of these offenses. 38 4
Very clearly, if the purpose of these dissenters was to establish a dual or rival union,
or to undermine the Steelworkers, the union should have the right to expel them. However, if the dues-protest committee was organized for the purpose of criticizing the
policies of the international president, their conduct should be protected. What is
necessary then is that these men be tried by an impartial body that functions with386uniit
form standards and procedures.38 5 From newspaper and magazine accounts
would seem that the dues-protest committee members are merely exercising their right
that to date five of the leading
to speech. This is partially substantiated from the fact
38 7
dissenters have been acquitted by their local unions.
While it thus appears that the major stumbling block in the way of the members'
freedom of expression is procedural, nonetheless some unions do have substantial provisions in their constitutions which place genuine restrictions on this right. These provisions are all aimed at prohibiting, at least in some circumstances, the members' right
to distribute circulars or to publicize intra-union affairs. In several union constitutions
there are provisions which state that no member or constituent local in the union
may distribute any circular or document dealing with union matters unless they obtain
prior approval from the international officers. 38 8 The Bricklayer's constitution specifies
that anyone accused of violating this section will be subject to immediate suspension
pending trial and determination of the case. 389 In the Flint Glass Workers Union, the
international president is vested with the discretionary power of suspending or expelling guilty parties. 390 The Granite Cutters provide for a ten-dollar penalty and
382

81 MoNTmxy LAB. Rnv. 1265 (1958).

383

Id. at 1266.

384 The events leading up to the convention action against the Dues-Protest Committee is set
out in 81 MONTHiY LA. REV. 1265-66 (1958).
385 For an elaboration of the procedural problems, see pp. 395-96 supra.
386 In addition to the article in 81 MoNTHLY LAB. REv. supra note 384, see New York Times, Sept.
9, 1958, p. 1, col. 1; Chicago Daily News, Dec. 12, 1958, p. 11, col 1.
387

82 MoNTnLy LAB. REV. iv (1959).

388 These include such unions as American Flint Glass Workers, CONST., art. 20, § 2, p. 78 (1957);
Granite Cutters Int'l Ass'n, CONST., § 23, p. 12 (1956); Bricklayers Int'l Union, CoNsT., art. IV,
§ 3, p. 15 (1956); Brotherhood of Ry. Clerks, CONST., art. 26, § 2, p. 63 (1955).
389 Bricklayers Int'l Union, CONsr., art. IV, § 3, p. 15 (1956).
390 American Flint Glass Workers, CONsr., art. XX, § 2, p. 78 (1957).
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publish the names of the guilty parties in the union paper. 391 In addition to broad
provisions against circularizing, several unions have provisions specifically dealing with
circulars used in connection with elections. In two unions there is an absolute prohibition against the use of cards, letters, or circulars in a campaign for office, and any
candidate violating these provisions will be disqualified from holding office. 89 2 The
Railway and Steamship Clerks require that any communication intended to influence
the vote on a referendum must be approved by the international president.3 93 The
final type of real deterrent to the members' right
to speak is a general provision against
39 4
publicizing the internal affairs of the union.
Undoubtedly such provisions are rooted in the histories of these unions. As a matter
of self-preservation, early unions did not wish their internal affairs divulged since the
possibility of retaliation by management was present. The attempts of management to
dominate and influence unions may have necessitated provisions against circularizing
the union without first clearing the matter with the international officers. These reasons
no longer exist and such provisions seem to be a wholly unwarranted interference with
the right of union members to express themselves freely.
2) Local Meetings and Elections: Formal Procedures
The right to vote and the right to free expression do not exist in a vacuum. They
are meaningful only in the terms of the actual operation of the union. For the right
to vote to be effective there must be regular and democratic elections. Similarly the
right to speech is rather ephemeral without regular meetings at which the members'
views may be aired. The formal provisions which were studied in respect to this problem
deal with requirements as to the time of meetings, and procedure for elections.
Nearly two-thirds of the international constitutions set forth requirements compelling local unions to hold-meetings at certain definite times. (See Table 1)
TABLE 1
75 INTERNATIONAL CONSTITUTIONS CLASSIFIED ACCORDING TO PROVISIONS FOR
HOLDING LOCAL MEETINGS

Provisions
No. Unions
No Provision
27
Every Two Weeks
6
Monthly
29
Every Two Months
1
Quarterly
3
Semi-annually
1
At Discretion of Local
5
No Local Unions
3
Many of these constitutional provisions are minimum requirements and the locals
may meet more often than specified in the constitution.3 95 For though the constitution
of the Printing Pressman calls for semi-annual meetings, regular meetings are undoubtedly held more often than every six months. 396 It would seem that in those unions
which set regular periods for meetings, the members should have able opportunity to
3 97
air their views.
Granite Cutters Int'l Ass'n, CONSr., § 23, p. 12 (1957).
392 These two unions are the International Union of United Brewery Workers, CoNsT., art VIII,
§ 3(a), (b), pp. 42-43 (1956); and Granite Cutters Int'l Ass'n, CONST., § 23, p. 12 (1956).
393 Brotherhood of Ry. Clerks, CONST., art. 26, § I, p. 63 (1955).
394 See Hotel Employees Int'l Union, CONST., art. XX, § l(d), p. 56 (1957); American Fed'n of
Govt. Employees, CoNsr., art XII, § 3(f), p. 24 (1956).
395 E.g., International Bhd. of Elec. Workers, CONST., art XVII, §§ 2-4, pp. 43-44 (1958).
396 This constitutional provision of the International Printing Pressmen Union reads as follows:
"If any subordinate union shall fail to hold regular meetings for a period of six months its charter
shall be thereby automatically forfeited." CoNsT., art XXVIII, § 43, p. 84 (1956).
391
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The real problem arises where there is no requirement that the local union hold
regular meetings, or where the matter is left to the discretion of the local. Of the twentyseven unions which do not provide for local meetings, all but one have provisions in
3 98
and with the
their constitution allowing the locals to adopt their own by-laws,
exception of two, all of these constitutions require that the proposed local by-laws be
submitted to the international for approval before they can take effect.3 99 The international office therefore has the opportunity to insist on provisions in the local by-laws
requiring regular meetings. 40 0 Similarly, the five unions which explicitly leave the
matter of setting meeting dates to the local union, require that the locals adopt by-laws
which must meet the approval of the international. 401 The election procedures to be
followed by local unions are regulated in most union constitutions. If union democracy
is to function properly, elections should be held at definite and reasonably frequent
intervals, the opportunity to vote and assurances of secrecy in balloting should be
accorded all members, and to deter any possible tampering with election results, the
ballots should be counted by an impartial election committee.
Eighteen of the international constitutions surveyed contained no provisions establishing a set term for union officers. (See Table 2).
TABLE 2
PROVISIONS IN

75

INTERNATIONAL CONSTITUTIONS CLASSIFIED ACCORDING TO

TERM OF OFFICE FOR OFFICERS

Provisions
No provision
6 Months - I Year
1 Year
Eighteen Months
One Year - Two Years
One Year - Three Years
One Year - Four Years
Two Years
Two Years - Three Years
Two Years - Four Years
Three Years
Three Years - Four Years
Four Years
At Discretion of Local Union
Minimum Term One Year - No Maximum
Minimum Term Two Years - No Maximum
No Local Unions
Others Whose Provisions Are Too Ambiguous
or Uncertain to Reasonably Classify

No. Unions
18
1
8
1
5
1
3
15
1
2
2

I
3
3
1
2
3
5

397 A large number of these unions provide a penalty for locals which do not hold their regular
hmeetings; e.g., International Bhd. of Elec. Workers, CONST., art XVII, § 4, pp. 44 (1958); Brotherhood of Painters, CONST., § 162(a), p. 63 (1955); United Bhd. of Carpenters, CONST AND LAWS,
Standing Decision, Feb. 15, 1887, p. 60 (1957).
398 This union is the Cigar Makers Int'l Union.
399 These two unions are the National Fed'n of Post Office Clerks and the Seafarers Int'l Union.
While there is no requirement that local by-laws be submitted for approval by the International, both
of these unions require that the local by-laws not conflict with the constitution or laws of the
International Union. National Fed'n of Post Office Clerks, CONsr., art. VIII, § 4, pp. 17-18 (1954);
Seafarers' Int'l Union CONST., art. III, § 11, pp. 2-3 (1957).
400 See, e.g., United Elec. Workers, CONST., art. 21, § A, pp. 31-32 (1957); Retail Clerks Int'l
Ass'n., Const., § 22(a), pp. 38-39 (1955); Int'l Moulders Union, CONSr., § 94, pp. 47-48 (1956);
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All of the first eighteen unions with the exception of the Cigar Makers provide for
adoption of local by-laws subject to the approval of the international officers.4 02 Of those
unions allowing the locals to elect officers for longer than two year terms, two of them
provide for the recall of officers, 40 3 but only if two-thirds of the members voting vote
for the recall. In the remaining unions the only way that the local members may remove
an officer is through the procedure of trying and convicting the officer of an offense
against the union. Obviously this is no substitute for frequent elections.
The procedures to be followed in local elections are treated in detail in less than
half of the constitutions. (See Tables 3A, 3B, and 3C).
TABLE 3
75 INTERNATIONAL CONSTITUTIONS CLASSIFIED ACCORDING TO PROVISIONS
FOR METHODS OF SELECTING LOCAL OFFICERS, SECRET
BALLOT, AND IMPARTIAL ELECTION COMMITTEES.

A. Provision For Method of Electing Local Officers
No Provision
34
Members voting at meeting
12
Referendum
6
Voting by mail
4
At local discretion
10
No local unions
3
Other
6
B. Provision for Secret Ballott
Mandatory
25
No Provision
40
At local discretion
5
No local unions
3
Other
2
C. Provision for Impartial Election Committee
Mandatory
23
No Provision
48
At local discretion
1
No local unions
3
Several factors undoubtedly account for the omission of detailed provisions regulating the conduct of local union elections. Since conditions within a union will vary to
a great extent from one locality to another, it is perhaps more practical for the international to allow the locals to establish their own procedures in their local by-laws.
Secondly, a large number of unions are committed to a principle of localism from a
belief that centralization within the union would be dangerous.4 04 Finally, it is to be
remembered that the international passes on the local by-laws and may always step in
to assure democracy, or the members themselves can appeal election irregularities to
4 05
the international.
Glass Bottle Blowers Ass'n, CoNsr., art XI, § 2, p. 24 (1957); International Woodworkers, CONST.,
art. VI, § 15, p. 20 (1957).

401 These five unions and the applicable constitutional provisions are: Communication Workers
of America, CONST., art. M, § 8(d),(i), p. 24 (1957); Bakery Workers Int'l Union, CONsT., art.
XIV, §§ 3, 5, pp. 27-28 (1956); International Ladies' Garment Workers, CONST., art. 5, §§ 4 (a),6,
pp. 23-24 (1956); Boot Workers, CONST., §§ 36,38, pp. 26-27 (1957); International Longshoremen's
Ass't., CONST., art. XII, § 6, p. 22, art. XIII, § 11(6), p. 26 (1957).
402 See the discussion infra p. 424, concerning the adoption and approval of local by-laws.
403 International Union of Operating Eng'rs, CONST., art. XXIII(8), p. 104 (1956); Brotherhood
of Locomotive Firemen, CONST., art. 8, § 42(c), p. 106 (1953).
404 An example of a union which is strongly committed to localism is the UAW. See TAFT op. cit.
supra,note 367 at 213.
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3) National Elections: Formal Procedures
Union constitutions generally set forth in detail the procedures for the nomination
and election of national officers. A recent study by the Bureau of Labor Statistics analyzes the constitutional provisions governing the election of national officers.40 8 As this
study shows, (see Table 4), the vast majority of unions nominate and elect their international officers at their conventions.

TABLE

4407

Nomination and Election Procedure
No. Unions
Nominated and elected by convention
80
Nominated at convention; elected by membership
9
Nominated at local meetings; elected by convention
2
Nominated at local meetings; elected by membership
16
Nominated both at locals and conventions; elected by convention
1
Nomination procedure not given; elected by convention
3
TABLE 5408
Voting
Elected
A.
B.
C.
D.
Elected
A.
B.

No. Unions
86
23
15
17
31
25
16
9

at convention
Roll call vote
Secret ballot
Ballot (no reference to secrecy)
No Provision
by membership referendum
Secret ballot
Ballot (no reference to secrecy)

It appears that the procedures set forth in the vast majority of union constitutions
as to be nomination and election of national officers are democratic. Pehaps the only
real weakness is in those constitutions which do not specify that a secret ballot is
guaranteed in a membership referendum. However, the term "ballot" as used in these
constitutions would seem to imply some type of secrecy in voting.
Terms of office for the international officers are established in all but two of the
union constittuions surveyed. (See Table 6)

TABLE

6409

PROVISIONS IN 111 INTERNATIONAL CONSTITUTIONS CLASSIFIED ACCORDING TO
TERM OF OFFICE FOR INTERNATIONAL OFFICERS

Provisions
1 Year
2 Years
3 Years
4 Years
5 Years
Other
No Provision

No. Unions
6
42
14
34
10
3
2

405 It is an offense in most unions to commit any type of election fraud. See for example;
National Maritime Union, CONST., art. 12, § 18, p. 50 (1957); International Union of United Steelworkers, CONST., art. V, § 24 (1956). Other unions have a procedure for filing an election protest
with the International. See United Ass'n of Journeymen of the Plumbing Industry, CONST., § 125, p.

60 (1956).

406 Cohany and Phillips, Election and Tenure of International Union Officers, 81 MONTHLY LAB.
Rnv. 1221 (1958).
407 Id. at 1222.
408 Id. at 1225.
409

Ibid,

NOTES
As has already been observed, those unions which elect officers for longer than fouryear terms are being urged by the AFL-CIO Ethical Practice Commission to amend their
constitutions by setting a maximum term of four years for officers.
4) Conclusion

To attempt to draw any conclusions as to the efficacy of the various union constitutions in securing the rights of the members or to evaluate the wisdom of the provisions in their constitutions is exceptionally difficult. Each union has its own peculiar
problems. Differences in jurisdiction, traditions, membership composition and geographical location of locals require different treatment. The UAW, which has a deep-rooted
democratic tradition, has no provision for the recall of officers. Yet the Operating
4 11
Engineers, which is hardly a model of democracy, 410 has just such a provision.
Even in view of these difficulties it nonetheless appears that the provisions surrounding
this area of internal democracy are generally fair and adequate.
In the era of modern industrial enterprise unions must be strong. Consequently they
must have the authority to maintain internal discipline by punishing those members
who would disrupt or undermine the union. Thus, as indicated, the broad provisions
against slander are not essentially limitations on inter-union democracy. Perhaps the
major flaw in union constitutions is the failure to provide sufficient standards for the
conduct of local elections. While localism may be a value well worth preserving, there
is little virtue in failing to set at least minimum standards for local elections. Leaving
too much authority in the hands of the local in these matters has proven to be a real
source of abuse. Perhaps the outstanding example of this can be found in the case
of the International Longshoremen's Association. "[T]he constitutional structure of the
ILA is such that the various locals chartered by the International have a large degree of
autonomy. '4 12 As a result of this extreme local autonomy, several large New York
locals became dominated by corrupt leaders and the International was powerless to
deal with the situation. 413
To be sure there are provisions in some union constitutions which seem to present
a serious threat to the freedom of the individual members. The subordinate local
setup of the Operating Engineers and the provisions in some union constitutions against
circulars are examples of unduly restrictive provisions. There can be no justification
for the wholesale disenfranchisement of members resulting from the subordinate local
system of the Operating Engineers. 41 4 Since unions do provide penalties for actions
which are truly inimical to the best interests of organization, there would also seem
to be no sound reason for the ban against circulars. It would seem to be far better to
allow the members the right to circulate petitions, statements or campaign literature
freely. If any member were to abuse this right by circulating slanderous or malicious
matters or by advocating policies which would destroy the union, he could be tried
and punished for such an offense.
Unions themselves are quite aware of this problem. The extensive educational programs carried on in many unions in an attempt to encourage fuller participation by
the members represents a genuine attempt to get at the underlying problem of apathy
on the part of the vast majority of union members. 415 The insistence by the AFL-CIO
on the adoption of the Ethical Practices Codes and their determined efforts to remove
410 S. REP. No. 1417, 85th Cong. 2d Sess. 43743 (1958). The Ethical Practices Committee AFLCIO proceeded immediately to investigate this union and substantial improvements have been made.
See 81 MoNTHLY LAB. REv. 301, 422-23 1155 (1958).
411 International Union of Operating Eng'rs, CoNsr., art. XVIII, § 3, pp. 70-71 (1956).
412 Board of Inquiry on Longshore Industry Work Stoppage, Oct.-Nov., 1951, Port of New York,
Final Rep. to Industrial Comm'r, p. 72 (N.Y. 1952), cited in TAFT, op. cit. supra, note 367 at 134.
413 Cf. TAFT, op. cit supra note 367, at 134; Bell, Some Aspects of the New York Longshore
Situation, 7 PRoCEmm s oF INDus RYAL ReLATioNs RSEARCH ASsocuATioN 298 (1954).
414 The McClellan committee report states that only 46% of the membership are allowed to vote

under the provision. S. REP. No. 1417, 437.
415 Hays, The Union and its Members, 11 N.Y.U. ANN. CoNF. IAB. 35, 37 (1958).
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corruption from the union movement has been meeting with a great deal of success.
As was indicated earlier, a large number of unions have adopted these codes and even
a union like the Operating Engineers has taken real steps toward complying with
them. In addition, two major unions, the UAW and the Upholsterers' Union, have
established independent review boards to handle inter-union problems.4 16
The encroachment of hoodlums and racketeers on some areas of the labor movement does not seem to be the result of constitutional weaknesses in the unions execept
in rare instances. Rather, it would seem that the problem of organized crime pervades
all parts of the national scene. As the McClellan hearings have demonstrated, criminals
have moved into some areas of business as well as labor and have even made their influence felt in state and local governments. The American labor unions as viewed
through their constitutions, rules and policies seem to have developed an organizational
structure which permits the average member to participate quite freely in the governmental process of his union.
B. The JudicialRole
The growth of labor unions is a relatively recent development in our history. As a
result of this, comparatively few cases involving issues of internal union democracy
have been presented to the courts.4 17 Thus, there has been no real opportunity for
the courts to evolve an articulate body of law governing the relationship between
the individual and his union. When the courts are confronted by a controversy involving an internal dispute, they generally will refer to the union as a voluntary association,4 18 and will at least purport to decide cases in terms of the law of voluntary
associations.
1) The Right to Vote
There are apparently no reported cases where an individual member sought to
have his personal right to vote in a union election enforced by the courts. However,
there are a number of cases where the right to vote was indirectly involved in suits
by members to compel the holding of an election. Perhaps the leading case of this
nature is Dusing v. Nuzzo.4 19 The plaintiffs in Nuzzo were individual members of
Local 17 of the Hodcarriers. They brought an action to compel the holding of an
election in their local and to obtain an accounting of the union funds. Contrary to the
local constitution, which specified that officers should be elected annually, the local
had held no election for four years. The court, before granting the relief sought for, set
forth three essential requirements for judicial intervention in such a case. First,
there had to be a property right or its equivalent involved. Secondly, a breach of the
union constitution or laws had to be shown. And finally, possible internal remedies
must have been exhausted or shown to be futile.42 0 The court found that the local
constitution had clearly been violated in not holding annual elections. Further, the
court reasoned that in as much as the officers of the union were responsible for
bargaining on behalf of the members, the iaembers had a property right in the selection
of men who would best represent their economic interests. Finally, the court found that
all attempts to obtain relief from the International had been singularly unsuccessful.
On appeal to the appellate division, the order for the holding of an election was
421
affirmed with a modification which compelled the use of voting machines.
The approach taken by the New York courts in the Dusing case is illustrative of
the approach which most courts have taken in this area. While some ground their
416 See pp. 396-97 supra, for a discussion of the operation of these review boards.
417 Writing in 1951, Professor Summers found but 218 opinions in the area of union discipline.
Summers, Legal Limitations on Union Discipline, 64 HAIv. L. REv. 1050 (1951).
418 E.g., State ex rel. Givens v. Superior Court, 233 Ind. 235, 117 N.E.2d 553 (1954); Armstrong
v. Duffy, 90 Ohio App. 233, 103 N.E.2d 760 (1951); Way v. Patton, 195 Ore. 36, 241 P.2d 895 (1952).
419 177 Misc. 35, 29 N.Y.S.2d 882, modified, 23 App. Div. 59, 31 N.Y.S.2d 849 (1941).
420 Id. at 883.
421

Dusing v. Nuzzo, 23 App. Div. 59, 31 N.Y.S.2d 849 (1941).

NOTES
decision on a contractual right of the members to a new election, 422 instead of the
usual property-interest theory, the terms of the union constitution regulating elections
will normally be enforced. 423 Thus, where the union constitution provides that an
election or referendum be held by secret ballot, and at least part of the balloting was
not secret, there is authority that the election will be declared null and void and a nevi
424
election required.
It does not appear, however, that the courts will compel a literal compliance with
the provisions of the constitution if there has been substantial compliance and the
election was fairly administered. In Kennedy v. Doyle,425 the plaintiffs sought to
vacate an election and to obtain an order for a new election, alleging, inter alia, that the
nominations were held two months earlier than specified in the union constitution. The
court found that at the nomination meeting in September, 2,000 of the 2,800 members
of the local were present, including the plaintiff, and no one protested the early
nominations. On these facts the court held that there had been substantial compliance
with the constitution, and since the elections had been conducted fairly, the judgment
was for the defendent union. Additionally, any action to compel a new election would
seem to be subject to the usual equitable defenses. Thus, in one case the plaintiffs
who waited two years to bring an action were barred by the doctrine of laches. 42 6
Where there is an irregularity in an election conducted among delegates from
several locals, the courts will apply the same rules as they apply to the conduct of local
elections. In Lacey v. O'Rourke,427 where the incumbent president showed that illegal
votes had been cast against him in the election for president of Joint Council 16 of the
Teamsters, the court found that certain disputed votes, allowed by the International,
were clearly invalid. Since further appeal to the International would be futile, the court
granted a temporary injunction restraining the union from removing the plaintiff from
office.
However, not every court will compel the holding of an election, even if the
three elements of the Dusing4 2 8 case are present. Perhaps the outstanding example of
a refusal of the courts to compel the holding of an election can be found in State ex rel.
Givens v. Superior Court.42 9 The plaintiffs in this case had shown that the executive
board of the union did not contemplate holding an election for officers as required
by the constitution. They succeeded in getting the trial court to issue a mandatory injunction to compel the holding of an election and to place the plaintiffs' names on the
ballot. The Supreme Court of Indiana granted a permanent writ of prohibition against
the enforcement of the order entered by the trial court. The court reasoned that a
voluntary association has the right to adopt its own rules and regulations and that the
courts should not control the administration of the association's constitution, or enforce
rights springing therefrom. 430 While the court gave additional reasons for the decision, 43 1 the heart of
the decision lay in the court's literal acceptance of the voluntary
43 2
association doctrine.
422 E.g., O'Neill v. United Ass'n of Journeymen Plumbers, 358 Pa. 531, 36 A.2d 325 (1944); Ash
v. Holdeman, 13 Misc. 2d 528, 175 N.Y.S.2d 135 (Sup. Ct. 1958), modified, 5 App. Div. 2d 1017,
174 N.Y.S.2d 215 (1958).
423 While the cases discussed in the text deal with the enforcement of specific provisions in the

constitutions, there is authority for allowing a union to adopt provisions of the state election laws
when the union constitution is silent regarding a specific dispute within the union. Zacharias v. Siegal,
7 Misc. 2d 58, 165 N.Y.S.2d (Sup. Ct. 1956), aff'd, 5 App. Div. 2d 887, 173 N.Y.S.2d 1003 (1958).
424 Waldman v. Ladiskey, 101 N.Y.S.2d 87 (Sup. ct. 1950).
425 140 N.Y.S.2d 899 (Sup. Ct. 1955).
426 Fritsch v. Rarback, 199 Misc. 356, 98 N.Y.S.2d 748 (1950). The court seemed to feel that the
delay in bringing the action was essentially a tactical maneuver to upset the administration of the
district council.
427 147 F. Supp. 922 (S.D.N.Y. 1956).
428 177 Misc. 35, 29 N.Y.S.2d 882, modified, 23 App. Div. 59, 31 N.Y.S.2d 849 (1941).
429 233 Ind. 235, 117 N.E.2d 553 (1954).
430 The two cases which the court relied on were: Plemenik v. Prickitt, 97 NJ. Eq. 340, 127 At.
342 (Ct. Err. & App. 1925), which involved alleged irregularities in the adoption of by-laws by the
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Obviously, if a union is to be viewed as nothing but a social association, a court
might legitimately refuse to interfere with an election for the want of a property
right.48 3 However, when most of the courts refer to a union as a voluntary association,
they are not treating unions as a fraternal or social society. 43 4 Rather, by calling
unions voluntary, courts seem to be 4committing
themselves, at least implicitly, to a
38
belief in the desirability of pluralism.

Since unions are subject to regulation both by statutes and by courts, the problem of elections is thus a matter of degree of regulation. Most courts wish to avoid
interfering with the internal affairs of unions unless such interference is absolutely
necessary to preserve some overriding right of the individual members. Thus, in
election cases, as in other areas of intra-union activity, the courts will require that the
aggrieved party exhaust the internal remedies which are available within the union.436
The underlying reason for this requirement was set forth
by Justice Frankfurter in
437
a dissenting opinion in Elgin, J. & F. R. Co. v. Burley:
Union membership generates complicated relations. Policy counsels against judicial
intrusion upon these relations. If resort to courts is at all available, it certainly should
not disregard and displace the arrangements which the members of the organization
voluntarily estblish for their reciprocal interests and by which they bind themselves to
be governed. . . To ask courts to adjudicate the meaning of the Brotherhood rules
and customs without preliminary resort to remedial proceedings within the Brotherhood is to encourage influences of disruption within unions instead of fostering
these unions as stabilizing forces.

While the courts are reluctant to intervene in union disputes until all available
remedies have been pursued within the union, courts generally will intervene without
any actual finding of a property right,43s or will readily find either a property4 9 or
a contractual 440 right in the election of officers. However, if an appeal within the
union will be clearly futile, the courts will probably intervene. 44 '
Grand Lodge of Free and Accepted Masons of New Jersey, and Kearns v. Howley, 188 Pa. 116, 41
At. 273 (1898), which involved irregularities in the elections of a county political organization.
431 The court also indicated that union election matters were political questions beyond the
jurisdiction of the court and that the right to vote was a privilege rather than a property or civil
right.
432 A few older cases can be found where the courts refused to take action in regard to union
elections since they were "voluntary associations." E.g. Bennett v. Kearns,- 88 Adt. 806 (R.I. Sup. Ct.
1913). However, even among the older cases there is precedent for judicial interference where the
constitution or laws of the union are being violated. See Williams v. District Executive Board, UMW,
1 Pa. D. & C. 31 (1921).
483 Cf. State ex rel. Givens v. Superior Court, 233 Ind. 235, 117 N.E.2d 553, 555 (1954). A
number of recent cases may be found where the court has declined to intervene, alluding to a lack
of a property right. But upon closer examination they essentially involve exhaustion of remedies. See
Leahigh v. Beyer, 52 Ohio Op. 63, 116 N.E.2d 458 (C.P. 1953), Way v. Patton, 195 Ore. 36, 241
P.2d 895 (1952).
434 "But a labor union is not a social club. It is an economic instrumentality conceived in the
necessities of making a living under the expansive influence of modern industrial concepts." Dusing
v. Nuzzo, 177 Misc. 35, 29 N.Y.S.2d 882, 884, modified, 23 App. Div. 59, 31 N.Y.S.2d 849 (1941).
435 Cf. Nash, The Union and Its Members, 11 N.Y.U. ANN. CONF. LAB. 35 (1958).
436 Way v. Patton, 195 Ore. 36, 241 P.2d 895 (1952); Leahigh v. Beyer, 52 Ohio Op. 63, 116
N.E.2d 458 (C.P. 1953); Stanton v. Harris, 152 Fla. 736, 12 So. 2d 17 (1943).
437 325 U.S. 711, 757 (1945) (dissenting opinion).
438 Sibilia v. Western Elec. Employees Ass'n, 142 N.J. Eq. 77, 59 A.2d 251 (Ct. Err. & App. 1948);
see O'Hara v. Teamsters, 63 Pa. D. & C. 573 (1948).
439 Cf. Dusing v. Nuzzo 177 Misc. 35, 29 N.Y.S.2d 882, modified, 263 App. Div. 59, 31 N.Y.S.2d
"849 (1941); see also, Raevsky v. Upholsterers' Int'l Union, 38 Pa. D. & C. 187, 195 (1940).
440 Cf. O'Neill v. United Ass'n of Journeymen Plumbers, 348 Pa. 531, 36 A.2d 325 (1944).
441 Dusing v. Nuzzo, 177 Misc. 35, 29 N.Y.S.2d 882, modified, 23 App. Div. 59, 31 N.Y.S.2d 849
(1941). This exception and the several other exceptions which courts have engrafted on the exhaustion
of remedies rules has been subjected to criticism. Witmer, Civil Liberties and the Trade Union, 50
YALE L. J. 621 (1940). The author of this article maintains that the overriding considerations behind
the exhaustion of remedies doctrine makes these exceptions unwise. Instead of entering a final court
order where an exception such as futility of appeal within the union is pleaded, it is suggested that the
court enter a temporary order in the nature of a supersedeas device until the internal remedies have
been exhausted. Witmer, supra at 631. See Powell v. United Ass'n. of Plumbers and Pipefitters, 240
N.Y. 616, 148 N.E. 728 (1925).

NOTES
Whenever a clear showing of facts demanding judicial- intervention has been
presented to the courts, they have been practical, and imaginative in insuring that
their orders are carried out. Thus, in one case where an attempt was made to tamper
with the ballots, the court impounded the ballots and appointed a master to tabulate
and certify the results. A custodial receiver appointed by the court insured that the
442
duly elected officers were able to exercise their offices without interference.
Where a new election is required, the court -may appoint a master or other such officials
to supervise the election, 443 or the court may allow the local to conduct its own election
with appropriate safeguards, such as requiring the election of an impartial election
machines, coupled with an injunction against any
committee and the use of voting
444
interference with the election.
A recent example of the flexibility of a court of equity in handling internal disputes
in the union can be found in Cunningham v. English.445 The plaintiffs in this case,
previously had brought an action to restrain the officers who were elected at the 1957
Teamster convention from taking office on a claim that- the convention had been
rigged. At the end of the plaintiff's case, the parties entered into a consent order. By
the terms of this order, the officers elected at the Miami convention Were to assume
office provisionally. In addition, a three member Board of Monitors was appointed
(a member was apointed by both the plaintiff and the defendant, and the third
member by the court), for the purpose of establishing procedures for a new election
of officers in accordance with the international constitution. The instant case involved
an interpretation of this consent order. Judge Letts ruled that the powers of the Board
of Monitors:
[I]ncluded all proper efforts on the part of the Board to assure the rank and file membership . . . that a new convention would be conducted according to the provisions
of the International constitution and assuring the membership that their democratic
processes would not be violated.446

If the defendants are aggrieved by any recommendations of the monitors, they always
have recourse to the court to settle the controversy. While this case involved an
original consent order, there seems to be no reason why a court of equity cannot
appoint such447an officer to supervise the union until such time as a democratic election
can be held.
2) Conclusion
Although the courts have not attempted to ,define the nature or extent of the
members' right to vote, nonetheless some pattern emerges from the cases in this area.
The voluntary association theory, while still causing difficulty in an isolated case, has
become almost a legal fiction in the judicial treatment of unions' voting policies and
practices. The approach the courts seem to take when confronted with a dispute concerning a union election is to allow the union to adjust or settle the dispute within its own
framework of remedial procedures. But if the union refuses or neglects to provide for
an adequate disposition of the grievance, or violates the provisions of its constitution
in resolving the controvesy, the vast majority of courts stand ready to afford complete
relief to the aggrieved members.
'3) Right of Free Speech
Cases involving the members' right to speech often come to the courts in the form
of an action for reinstatement to membership on behalf of a member who was exSibilia v. Western Elec. Employees Ass'n, 142 NJ. Eq. 77, 59"A.2d 251 (Ct. Err. & App. 1948).
O'Neill v. United Ass'n of Journeymen Plumbers, 348 Pa. 531, 36 A.2d 325 (1944); See Wilson
v. Miller, 194 Tenn. 390, 250 S.W.2d 575 (1952).
444 Dusing v. Nuzzo, 177 Misc. 35, 29 N.Y.S.2d 882, modified, 263 App. Div. 59, 31 N.Y.S.2d 849
(1941).
445 Civil No. 2361-57, D.D.C., Dec. 11, 1958.
446 Id. at 3.
447 The power of the chancellor to appoint such monitors would seem to be closely analogous to
the power of appointing a receiver, which the chancellors developed.
442
443
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pelled for slander. Before the substantive questions of the members' right to speech
will be considered by the court, the plaintiff must meet the various procedural requirements for reinstatement. 448 The problem of free speech is not limited to cases of expulsion but may also be involved in libel or slander actions among union members
themselves.
Statements made in the course of a union meeting or printed in handbills during
an election campaign within the unions have been the cause of a number of libel or
slander actions. Generally these actions fail, thus enabling a member to discuss relevant
matters without fear of being rendered personally liable. The reason assigned by the
courts in denying relief to the party alleging the libel is that a qualified privilege attaches to statements made within the ranks of the union concerning union policies and
administration.4 49 In a recent California case, the defendant had distributed a pamphlet
in the course of a campaign for union office, charging his opponent with being a Communist. The appellate court upheld the judgment for the defendant since the statements
were made in good faith within the union ranks and were thus privileged. The court
went on to point out that: "There could scarcely be more appropriate occasions for
the exercise of uninhibited free speech." ' 450 This qualified privilege may be vitiated,
however, by the
showing of malice 4 5 ' or publication to those outside the common
4 52
interest group.
While the law shields statements made by a member within the union itself against
libel or slander actions, of far greater importance is the protection that the courts will
give to a member who has been disciplined by the union as a result of such statements.
Two avenues of approach have been taken by the judiciary in regard to this problem.
The courts may look to the substance of the alleged offense and to the nature of the
hearing accorded the member within the union, and decide whether the hearings were
of Rights or
fairly conducted.4 53 Or, the court may seek to extend either the Bill
4 54
the state constitution to cover and protect speech within the unions.
While there has been some authority in legal articles urging the application of
the Bill of Rights4 55 to unions, there appears to be only one recent case which has
applied the first amendment to protect members from union discipline.4 58 The
plaintiffs in this case had printed and distributed handbills in favor of a slate of
candidates for national offices in the union. The slate of officers whom they supported
lost the election, and they were brought before the national convention the following
summer and were convicted and fined for making malicious misrepresentations in the
course of a campaign. The court found that the statements in the handbill were not
libelous. The judge went on to declare that both the Ohio Constitution 457 and the
First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution protected the members' right to criticize
their officers. An injunction was granted against the enforcement of the fines by the
union.
448 See the discussion of union discipline, supra at 398.
449 See, Ward v. Painters' Local, 41 Wash. 2d 859. 252 P.2d 253 (1953); Garriga v. Townsend, 130
N.Y.S.2d 581 (Sup. Ct. 1954), modified, 285 App. Div. 199, 136 N.Y.S.2d 295 (1954); Krause v.
Bertrand, 323 P.2d 784 (Cal. 1958). There is a difference of opinion as to whether the privilege must
be pleaded in order that it be available for the defendant. Compare Spangler v. Glooer, 50 Wash.
2d 473, 313 P.2d 354 (1957), with De Mott v. Amalgamated Meat Cutters and Butchers, 157 Cal.
App. 2d 13, 320 P.2d 50 (1958).
450 Krause v. Bertrand, supra note 449, at 787.
451 Garriga v. Townsend, 285 App. Div. 199, 136 N.Y.S.2d 295 (1954), modifying 130 N.Y.S.2d
581 (Sup. Ct. 1954).
452 Ward v. Painters' Local, 45 Wash. 2d 533, 276 P.2d 576 (1954). See PROSSER, TORTS, 614-29
(2d ed. 1955).
453 E.g., Ames v. Dubinsky, 5 Misc. 2d 380, 70 N.Y.S.2d 706, 732 (Sup. Ct. 1947); Mahoney v.
Sailor's Union of the Pacific, 43 Wash. 2d 846, 264 P.2d 1095 (1953).
454 Crossen v. Duffy, 90 Ohio App. 252, 103 N.E.2d 769 (1951).
455 Aaron, Protecting Civil Liberties of Members in Unions, 2 PROCEEDINoS OF INDusTRiAL RELATIONS RESEARCH ASSOCIA-iON 28, 35 (1949).
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Crossen v. Duffy, 90 Ohio App. 252, 103 N.E.2d 769 (1951).
Ohio CONST. art. I, § 11.

NOTES
Though this decision probably was warranted, it nonetheless presents real conceptual difficulties. The broad language of the Ohio Constitution 458 undoubtedly
protects members who criticize their officers from disciplinary action by the union,
but there is certainly some doubt
as to whether the first amendment serves as a
459
restriction on the union's action.
This is not to say that everytime the members' right to speech is before the
court, the decision will be couched in constitutional language. For instance, in Ames v.
Dubinsky460 the suspension of four members of Local 10 of the International Ladies'
Garment Workers' Union was questioned. The plaintiffs were suspended for issuing
defamatory circulars during a local election campaign. The court found that the
statements were indeed defamatory and constituted a violation of the union constitution.
Since the hearings before the union tribunal were shown to be fair and impartial, the
suspensions were upheld, and no first amendment violation was alleged by the
plaintiffs nor discussed by the court. Although the judiciary has given the right to
speech maximum protection, still there is an occasional and recognized competing interest in the union's power to punish for dual unionism. This was recently considered
in two cases involving maritime unions. In the past few years, the militant seamen's
unions in this country have been engaged in a determined fight to remove communist
influences from the maritime and waterfront unions. It was out of this struggle that
these two cases developed.
The first arose out of the dispute between the Seamen's International Union of
North America and the Canadian Seamen's Union. The Canadian Seamen's Union
was communist-dominated almost from its inception in 1936.461 In 1949, the SIU
attempted to wrest control of the unlicensed seamen from the hands of the CSU. The
fight between these two unions became extremely bitter and physical violence was
widespread.
When the S.S. Agojohn, manned by members of the Sailor's Union of the
Pacific, a west-coast affiliate of the SIU, docked in Seattle in early May, 1949, members
of the CSU immediately threw a picket line around the ship. Members of the SUP and
the various AFL metal trades unions refused to honor the picket line thrown up by the
communist CSU. 462 At the next meeting of the Seattle Branch of the SUP, John
Mahoney, a former official in the SUP, and a long-time member of the union, arose
and asked, "Who gave the pie-cards the authority to engage in strike-breaking activities
and how come the membership of the organization was not informed of this?" This
was viewed as a direct attack on the officers and policies of the SUP, and charges of
slander, violation of the union oath and dual unionism were preferred against Mahoney.
458 "Every citizen may freely speak, write, and publish his sentiments on all subjects, being
responsible for the abuse of the right; and no law shall be passed to restrain or abridge the liberty
of speech or of the press." Ohio CONSr. art. I, § 11.
459 The first amendment does not apply to individuals. Public Util. Comm'n v. Pollock, 343 U.S.
451, 461 (1952) (dictum). The right of a private association like a housing development to restrict
the entry of Jehovah's Witnesses was held not to violate the first amendment. Watchtower Bible &
Tract Soc. v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. 297 N.Y. 339, 79 N.E.2d 433, cert. denied, 335 U.S. 886
(1948), rehearing denied, 335 U.S. 912 (1949). Similarly, the first amendment has been held not to
apply to private corporations. Massachusetts Universalist Convention v. Hildreth & Rogers Co., 183
F.2d 497 (1st Cir. 1950) (per curiam). However, the decision in this case might be sustained under
fthe notion that the union is an agent of the government by virtue of the authority it exercised under
federal statutes. Betts v. Easley, 161 Kan. 459, 169 P.2d 831 (1946). See Note, 56 YALE LJ. 731
(1947). Perhaps the court might even have reasoned that refusal to grant judicial relief to the
plaintiffs would somehow constitute "state action" within the terms of Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1
(1948). See Comment, The Impact of Shelley v. Kraemer on the State Action Concept, 44 CALIF. L.

Rav. 718 (1956).
460 5 Misc. 2d 380, 70 N.Y.S.2d 706 (Sup. Ct. 1947).
461 For the history of these events see TAFT, THE SmRucruRE AND GovmuqmENT OF LABOR
UNIONS 205-12 (1954); GOLDBERG, THE MAurrnm STORY 255-61 (1958); Wollett and Lampman,
The Law of Union Factionalism-The
Case of the Sailors, 4 STAN. L. Rnv. 177 (1952).
462 Seafarer's Int'l Union, PiocEEDnmGs Fnrm BmNmnAL CoNvENTioN, 86-87 (1951).
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Almost immediately Mahoney rallied support in Seattle, including a great deal of
support from various left-wing groups. A Mahoney Defense Committee was formed,
which published its own paper, Defender, which carried on a broad scale attack on
the SUP. Mahoney and at least thirty of his supporters were expelled for dual unionism.
Mahoney brought an action against the SUP, asking for reinstatement to membership
and damages for loss of work. The superior court granted the relief requested by the
468
plaintiff. On appeal to the Supreme Court of Washington, the judgment was affirmed.
The court decided that:
The conduct of respondent, either as charged or proved, was not a violation of
the union constitution, for which he can be expelled from the union. Whether it be
said that he asked a question or made a statement, he did so in the union meeting.
He spoke there upon union policies, as a member of the union, to the other members
present. This he should be able to do freely, without fear of explusion. The union
constitution does not provide to the contrary. The trial court was correct in holding,
in effect, that speech per se is not rebellion ....
The charge being insufficient, the
proceeding based upon it was a nullity and plaintiff's explusion was void.464

Few can quarrel with the holding that speech per se is not rebellion. However, two
serious defects manifest themselves in this decision. First of all, the court seems to be
holding the union to a requirement that charges 465 be drafted with an almost legal
formality. More importantly, as the dissenting opinion pointed out, the essential
problem of this case was not freedom of speech, but:
... the right of the majority rank-and-file, dues-paying members to determine upon
union policy, and to discipline a dissenting minority member, not merely for debating
or voicing opposition to such union policy in a closed union meeting, but for overt acts

463

Mahoney v. Sailors' Union of the Pacific, 43 Wash. 2d 846, 264 P.2d 1095 (1953).

464

Id. at 1097.

465

The written charge which was presented to Mahoney read as follows:
We, the undersigned book members and officials of the Sailors' Union of the
Pacific, hereby prefer charges against John Mahoney, Book No. 4344, for the
following reason:
Mahoney's scurrilous and defamatory remarks entered in the minutes
of the Seattle meeting May 23, 1949, when John Mahoney 'wanted to know
who gave the pie-cards the authority to engage in strike-breaking activities
and how come the membership of the organization were not kept advised of
this' and also because of his remarks entered in the minutes of the Seattle
meeting June 6, 1949, when Mahoney reiterated the same statement.
The above are definite violations of the Constitution of the Sailors'
Union of the Pacific which are listed as follows:
1. Violation of the Obligation.
2. Violation of Article III, Section 4.
3. Violation of Article V, Section 1.
The constitutional Provisions referred to in the charge are:
Obligation, I pledge my honor as a man, that I will be faithful to this Union,
and that I will work for its interest and will look upon every member as my
brother; that I will not work for less than Union wages, and that I will obey all
orders of the Union, I promise that I will never reveal the proceedings of the
Union to its injury or to persons not erititled to know them. And if I break
this promise, I ask every member to treat me as unworthy of friendship and
acquaintance, So Help Me God!

Art. III, § 4.

Any member who advocates and/or gives aid to the principles and policies
of any hostile or dual organization or gives aid or comfort to such, shall be
denied further membership in this Union.

Art. V, § 1.

It shall be the duty of each member to be true and loyal to the Union and the
labor cause, and to endeavor to put into practice the principles laid down in
the Preamble. Members shall treat the officers of the Union while discharging
their duties with due respect and consideration, and yield strict obedience to such
rules as the Union may see fit to adopt.
While the body -of the charge may not be drawn with precision, nonetheless, when considered with the sections of the Constitution referred to, it would seem that Mahoney was fully aware
of what he was being charged with. (Cited in Mahoney v. Sailors' Union of the Pacific, 43 Wash.
2d 846, 264 P.2d 1095, 1096 (1953).
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(a)

obstructing the policy of his union, (b)

defying orders of the officials of his

union, and (c) aiding and supporting a rival Canadian union. .
original.) 466

.

. (Emphasis in

What the majority so blithely overlooked is that no freedom of speech can be exercised
absolutely. Instead of riveting its attention on the property right of the expelled member
in his job, the court should have at least weighed the charge of "dual-unionism" and
realized that if the charge was well-founded it could vitally effect the property rights of
the entire union membership. It is in this context, as the dissent recognized, that this
right of speech must be viewed, and regardless of the ultimate decision, dual-unionism
cannot be ignored.
A similiar case arose in Madden v. Atkins. 4 67 The plaintiffs in this case had
supported a slate of officers in opposition to the incumbent officers of Local 88 of the
Masters, Mates and Pilots of America. During the course of the campaign they published a number of leaflets attacking the incumbent officers. After the defeat of
plaintiffs' slate of officers, they formed an association known as the American
Mariner's Association of the National Organization Masters, Mates & Pilots of
America and published their own newspaper, True Course. In addition to continuing
to continuing their attack on the officers of the local, they advocated merger of the
Masters, Mates and Pilots (AFL) with the Marine Engineers Beneficial Association
(CIO). Beyond this, they pressed for many of the ideas advocated by the Committee
for Maritime Unity which had been founded by Harry Bridges.
The plaintiffs were all charged with dual unionism and were tried and expelled
from the union. In their action for reinstatement, the court found first that the plaintiffs
had failed to exhaust their remedies within the union. The court further observed that
it was up to the union to determine whether the acts of the plaintiffs were inimical
to the best interests of the union. Since it is up to the union to make this decision, the
court held that they could not legitimately interfere in the internal processes of the
union so long as there was "any evidence whatsoever" 468 to sustain the conclusion of
the union trial board. Finding that evidence did exist to support the action by the
union the complaint was dismissed.
The appellate division modified the judgment by directing the reinstatement of the
plaintiffs, although refusing to allow damages. 46 9 The Court of Appeals sustained the
order for reinstatement and modified the 'judgment of the appellate division by granting
damages. 4 70 The court found that additional appeals within the union would be
futile. Further, they found that the campaign literature which had been distributed '4by
71
the plaintiffs was "nothing more than ardent and hard-hitting campaign literature.
On the issue of dual unionism, the court observed that at no time had the plaintiffs
advocated withdrawal from Local 88. Rather, their efforts were of the nature of a
partisan political group working in the interest of the union. Weighing and considering
the conflicting values of union solidarity and the individual's right to speech, the
court said:
The price of free expression and of political opposition within a union cannot be the

risk of explusion or other disciplinary action. In the final analysis, a labor union
profits, as does any democratic body, more by permitting free expression and free
political opposition than it may ever lose from any disunity that it may thus
evidence.472

466 Mahoney v. Sailors' Union of the Pacific, 43 Wash. 2d 846, 264 P.2d 1095, 1106 (1953). The
reasoning of the dissenting judge in the Mahoney case is similar to that found in Miller v. International Union of Operating Eng'rs, 118 Cal. App. 2d 752, 257 P.2d 85 (1953).
467 1 Misc. 2d 17, 147 N.Y.S.2d 19 (Sup. Ct. 1955).
468 Id. at 31.
469 Madden v. Atkins, 4 App. Div. 2d 1, 162 N.Y.S.2d 576 (1957).
470 Madden v. Atkins, 4 N.Y.2d 283, 151 N.E.2d 73, 174 N.Y.S.2d 633 (1958).
471 Id. at 639.
472 Id. at 640.
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4) Conclusion
Regardless of the decision and contrary to Mahoney, the Court of Appeals was fully
aware of, and gave serious consideration to, the real problem of dual unionism. While
there are a small number of cases in the area of free speech, it seems safe to assume
that a member who has voiced legitimate opposition within a union will be afforded
protection by the courts in any case coming before them. Statements made within
a union have been accorded a qualified privilege. More importantly, the individual
member will be protected from disciplinary *action by the union as a result of his
opposition. For when the courts are presented with a problem involving a conflict between the union solidarity and the members' right to speech, the courts have cast
their lot with the individual member.
C. Legislation
Existing legislation prescribing democratic standards for unions is sparse and
ineffective. Some five states have adopted statutes regulating union elections.4 73 There
seems to have been no effort to enforce the statutes, at least in the areas of union
elections and free speech. 474 However, a rash of proposed legislation has been proffered
in the present term of Congress. The most important bills of the ones introduced are
those of Senator Kennedy, 475 Senator Goldwater, 476 Senator McClellan 477 and Representative Barden.478 All of these bills contain provisions relating to the conduct of
union elections.
Perhaps the bill which has received the most publicity is the Kennedy bill. This
bill would require that national officers be elected at least every four years, either at a
convention of delegates chosen by secret ballot, or by secret ballot among the members
in good standing.4 79 Local officers would have to be elected at least every three years
by secret ballot.48 0 Unless the elections are held at the regular time provided for in
the union constitution, notice must be given every member of4 8the union by mail at
his last known address at least fifteen days before the election.
Several protective devices are included in the statute. It is provided that no
member may be denied his right to vote because his employer has delayed or defaulted in submitting his dues pursuant to a valid check-off authorization.48 2 All
minutes and records and the credentials of all delegates to a convention where officers
are elected must be preserved for one year and all ballots from any required secret
election must be preserved for one year.4 83 Dues money or employer contributions may
not be used to promote the candidacy of any person.48 4 Nor may any person who has
been convicted of any enumerated felony be eligible for election to office unless he
receives the approval of the Secretary of Labor.48 5 Where the union constitution does
not provide adequate procedures for the removal of officers guilty of serious misconduct,
upon complaint by any member the Secretary may permit the removal of such officer
by members of good standing, following a hearing and secret ballot of the membership. 48 6 Finally, the Secretary shall also have the authority to prescribe minimum
473 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 80-5-1 (1953); FLA. STAT. § 447.09 (1952); KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§ 44-809 (1949); MINN. STAT. § 179.19 (1953); TEx. REv. Civ. STAT., art. 5154 (1948).
474 None of the annotations following these statutes contain references to any reported cases involving an attempt to regulate union elections or to protect the members' right to speech.
475 S. 505, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., §§ 301-05 (1959).
476 S. 748, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., §§ 302-03 (1959).
477 S. 1137, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., §§ 101-04 (1959).
478 H.R. 4473, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., §§ 101-03 (1959).
479 S. 505, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., § 301(a) (1959).
480 Id. § 301 (b).
481 Id. § 301 (c).
482
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Id. §§301 (c), (d).
484 Id. § 301 (e).
485 Id. § 305 (a).
486 Id.§ 301 (f).
483
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standards relating to the removal of any local officer who is guilty of serious misconduct, 48 7 on similiar conditions of a hearing and a secret ballot.
The provisions of this bill would ultimately be enforced by the Secretary. Whenever
an individual member has exhausted his remedies within the union, or has received
no final decision within four months following his initial action, he may file a complaint with the Secretary alleging the violation of this act, including a violation of
the union constitution and by-laws. The Secretary would then investigate the complaint
and upon a determination that there is "probable cause to believe" 488 that a violation
has been committed and not been remedied, he would institute a civil action in a federal
district court against the union. If the court finds by a preponderance of the evidence
that a violation occurred which affected the outcome of the election, the election will
be voided, and a new election held under the supervision of the Secretary. 489
The Administration bill, 490 which was introduced by Senator Goldwater, is not
at great variance with the Kennedy bill in the provisions regulating union elections.
There are slight differences in that it allows a five-year term for national officers 491
and includes a requirement that every union establish recall procedures to remove
elected officers from office. 4 92 Additionally, individual members may maintain an action
to enforce the provisions of this bill. 493 The Secretary may, according to the terms of
this bill, proceed directly against a union without a formal charge being made by a
494
member.
The bills introduced by Senator McClellan 495 and Rep. Barden 496 are quite
similar to each other. Both of them include the same basic safeguards contained in
the Kennedy and the Goldwater bills, but they both differ from these bills in two
major respects. In addition to the safeguards in the Kennedy and Goldwater measures,
both the McClellan and the Barden bills require that every union shall incorporate
into their constitutions and by-laws, provisions guaranteeing such basic rights as
freedom of speech and assembly. 497 In addition, they set up elaborate requirements as
to the holding of local meetings and calling of conventions. The second major area
of difference involves the means of enforcing the bills. Both bills require that unions
file proof of compliance with the Secretary of Labor. Upon filing these documents, the
Secretary shall issue a certificate of compliance to the union. These certificates may
be withdrawn if the unions breach the provisions of these laws. Without such a certificate, no union may be certified by the NLRB, nor may they file unfair labor charges.
In addition, a non-complying union would lose its tax exemption under §501(c) of
the Internal Revenue Code of 1954.498
Conclusion
Any conclusion as to the actual rights of the individual union members to participate in the governmental processes of their union must of necessity be tentative. As
has been indicated the majority of unions seem to be democratic. Labor itself is aware
of the problems in this area and the leaders of the AFL-CIO are making a conscious
effort to correct the abuses which exist.
The case law relating to the right of speech and the right to vote, while sometimes
mesmerized by the older concepts of voluntary associations, seems to afford real proId. § 301 (g).
Id. § 302 (b).
Id. §§ 302 (a-(c).
490 S. 748, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959).
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tection to these rights. The high cost of court litigation, which at times prohibits suit by
the individual member might be solved by awarding attorneys' fees and costs to an individual member who successfully maintains an action compelling an election. 499
Certainly before any legislation is passed in this area, Congress should pay heed
to the pluralistic necessities of a democratic society. The excessive sanctions imposed
by the McClellan and Barden bills would perhaps not only weaken unions themselves,
but would ultimately injure the individual member of the union who would be denied
access to the NLRB. While the Kennedy and the Goldwater bills present a more reasonable approach to the problem of union elections, it would seem that the courts are protecting these rights adequately. Thus in this area of internal union procdures, extensive
legislative control of unions appears unnecessary.
G. R. Blakey
John A. Slevin
Paul H. Titus

499 See O'Connor v. Harrington, 136 N.Y.S.2d 881 (Sup. Ct. 1954), modified, 285 App. Div. 900,
138 N.Y.S.2d 1 (1955). Such procedure would be similar to costs awarded stockholders after successfully maintaining a corporate derivative action.

